08 abril 2016

Competencia entre dineros privados fiduciarios JESÚS FERNÁNDEZ-VILLAVERDE el 07/04/2016

Marginal Revolution habla hoy sobre mi nuevo trabajo sobre competencia de monedas privadas fiduciarias (aquí una copia del trabajo), escrito con Daniel Sanches. Los lectores de este blog conocen como empezó todo: a principios del otoño con mi serie de tres entradas sobre Bitcoin (unados y tres). En cuanto tenga tiempo hablaré del trabajo en este foro con más detalle.
Pero ahora quería explicar un tema colateral. Este trabajo, creo, es un buen ejemplo, volviendo ala discusión del otro día de Pedro Rey sobre el carácter académico de la economía, de cómo trabajamos los economistas en la realidad. Hay un fenómeno nuevo (Bitcoin), leemos sobre el mismo, tenemos curiosidad y construimos un modelo para intentar entender cómo funciona este fenómeno. En el proceso buscamos identificar los mecanismos principales, las fortalezas y debilidades de los argumentos y aprender cosas. De los resultados de mi trabajo hay cosas que sospechaba serían ciertas (bajo ciertas condiciones la competencia entre monedas privadas puede funcionar); cosas que no se me habría ocurrido pensar nunca sin haberme sentado a escribir un modelo (la posibilidad de espirales inflacionistas auto-realizadas en dineros privados); y cosas sobre las que ahora pienso distinto que hace unos meses (los efectos de red en el uso de moneda son mucho menos relevantes de lo que habría defendido en el otoño). Sin el uso de un modelo y la disciplina que las matemáticas te imponen no hubiese aprendido ni la mitad de las cosas que he aprendido. Muchas de las conjeturas que creíamos ser ciertas (y sobre las que, si me hubiese limitado al argumento verbal, seguro que habría sido capaz de elocuentemente explicar) resultaron no cumplirse y, al revés, muchas cosas que no sabíamos surgieron de las matemáticas sin nosotros buscarlas. Por supuesto el modelo es el modelo y uno tiene que juzgar, con sentido común, qué resultados son robustos y cuáles no, pero para eso está el desarrollo de la literatura. Ya me están llegando muchos comentarios (aunque muchos de los que se leen en Marginal Revolution no son muy buenos) y sugerencias, que empujaran la investigación.
Tanto el otro otro día en los comentarios a la entrada de Pedro como hoy he evitado hablar de “ciencia”. Tal palabra me parece evoca connotaciones confusas, con muchos pensando en el paradigma del físico realizando experimentos en un laboratorio y confundiendo características de esa fructífera labor con propiedades generales del trabajo académico. De hecho, el paradigma del físico no se aplica particularmente bien ni a muchas areas de las ciencias naturales. Inspirado por la tradición alemana, siempre he preferido la palabra Wissenschaft, que implica la idea de estudio sistemático y riguroso de un campo y que podríamos quizás traducir como “disciplina” o como “ciencia” solo si también admitimos expresiones como “ciencias jurídicas” o “ciencias históricas” (aceptación con la que estoy totalmente de acuerdo).
http://nadaesgratis.es/fernandez-villaverde/competencia-entre-dineros-privados-fiduciarios

Can Currency Competition Work?

by  on April 7, 2016 at 12:53 am in EconomicsLaw | Permalink
There is a new model and NBER paper to come from Jesus Fernandez-Villaverde and Daniel Sanches (pdf, ungated), here is the abstract:
Can competition among privately issued fiat currencies such as Bitcoin or Ethereum work? Only sometimes. To show this, we build a model of competition among privately issued at currencies. We modify the current workhorse of monetary economics, the Lagos-Wright environment, by including entrepreneurs who can issue their own fiat currencies in order to maximize their utility. Otherwise, the model is standard. We show that there exists an equilibrium in which price stability is consistent with competing private monies, but also that there exists a continuum of equilibrium trajectories with the property that the value of private currencies monotonically converges to zero. These latter equilibria disappear, however, when we introduce productive capital. We also investigate the properties of hybrid monetary arrangements with private and government monies, of automata issuing money, and the role of network effects.
I would stress a few points.  First, the world is going to have some form of currency competition whether one likes it or not.  That is already the case today, so these are very real questions, not just thought games for libertarians.
Second, the Bitcoin and broader cryptocurrency experience indicate that the marginal cost of issuing a new private currency is well above zero, contra some of the literature from the 1970s, which viewed the enterprise in terms of printing money and paying only for the additional paper.  Bitcoin can be interpreted as a commodity currency of sorts, where the relevant expenditures are on codebreaking and electricity, rather than digging up gold from the ground.  Once it is focal enough, it might be able to provide some version of rough price stability in terms of its unit.
Third, if your government is halfway legitimate and not broke, its currency is likely to be a dominant winner in these forms of currency competition, especially to the extent that currency is supported by the fiscal authority.  In this sense it is almost impossible to get away from a legitimate or even semi-legitimate government-issued currency
- See more at: http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2016/04/can-currency-competition-work.html#sthash.XLxh6o5c.dpuf

Can Currency Competition Work?∗ Jessus Fernandez-Villaverde University of Pennsylvania, NBER, and CEPR Daniel Sanches Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
Can competition among privately issued fiat currencies work? The sudden appearance of Bitcoin, Ethereum, and other cryptocurrencies has triggered a wave of public interest in privately issued monies.1 A similar interest in the topic has not been seen, perhaps, since the vivid polemics associated with the demise of free banking in the English-speaking world in the middle of the 19th century (White, 1995). Somewhat surprisingly, this interest has not translated, so far, into much research within monetary economics. Most papers analyzing the cryptocurrency phenomenon have either been descriptive (B¨ohme, Christin, Edelman, and Moore, 2015) or have dealt with governance and regulatory concerns from a legal perspective (Chuen, 2015).2 In comparison, there has been much research related to the computer science aspects of the phenomenon (Narayanan, Bonneau, Felten, Miller, and Goldfeder, 2016).
Conclusion In this paper, we have shown how a system of competing private currencies can work. Our evaluation of such a system is nuanced. While we offer glimpses of hope for it by showing the existence of stationary equilibria that deliver price stability, there are plenty of other less desirable equilibria. And even the best equilibrium does not deliver the socially optimum amount of money. Furthermore, at this stage of the research, we do not have any argument to forecast the empirical likelihood of each of these equilibria. Although a system of competing currencies does not necessarily imply efficiency and stability, we have identified the characteristics of an efficient and stable private monetary arrangement under free entry, given that our framework is sufficiently flexible to consider relevant extensions of the baseline model. As we have seen, the introduction of productive capital fundamentally changes the properties of the model, implying the existence of a unique equilibrium allocation that can be arbitrarily close to the efficient allocation depending on the technological rate of return on capital. This result is illuminating as it identifies the characteristics of a socially beneficial private monetary system. We have, nevertheless, just scratched the surface of the study of private currency competition. Many topics, including the analysis of the different degrees of moneyness of private currencies (including interest-bearing assets and redeemeable instruments), the role of positive transaction costs among different currencies, the entry and exit of entrepreneurs, the possibility of market power by currency issuers, or the consequences of the lack of enforceability of contracts are some of the avenues for future research that we hope to tackle shortly. 
References:
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Hayek, Good Money, Part 2, ed. by S. Kresge. The University of Chicago Press. Hendrickson, J. R., T. L. Hogan, and W. J. Luther (2016): “The political economy of Bitcoin,” Economic Inquiry, forthcoming. Holmstrom, B., ¨ and J. Tirole (2011): Inside and Outside Liquidity. The MIT Press. Kareken, J., and N. Wallace (1981): “On the indeterminacy of equilibrium exchange rates,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 96(2), 207–222. 
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Fuente
http://economics.sas.upenn.edu/~jesusfv/currency_competition.pdf
http://nadaesgratis.es/fernandez-villaverde/mis-aventuras-con-bitcoin-i-el-dinero-es-memoria

Otros enlaces:

https://docs.google.com/document/d/17XT0xvRGoGDxAs25kCKb4tG4MXNzude2iEriKXOrwi0/edit


http://articulosclaves.blogspot.com.es/2015/12/bit-coin-teorias-del-dinero-por-jesus.html