¿Europa primero? El auge de la política industrial de la UE Fomento y protección del mercado único
3 Theory and hypotheses: EU integration scholarship meets developmental network states
Dada la naturaleza fragmentada de las iniciativas de política industrial de la UE y la multidimensionalidad de su mandato de desarrollo, nuestro empeño requiere tanto un marco analítico para sistematizar y rastrear las funciones de desarrollo como una teoría de la integración regional que dé cuenta de los motores, el calendario y la variación de los resultados de integración de las funciones de política industrial. Para ello, aprovechamos el marco analítico de las DNS y lo combinamos con las teorías de integración de la UE.
3.1 The developmental functions of developmental network states
El concepto de DNS ha sido desarrollado en una serie de trabajos por Seán O'Riain (Citation2000, Citation2004) y Fred Block (Citation2008) para teorizar un nuevo papel del Estado en el desarrollo económico dentro de las sociedades posfordistas y la economía del conocimiento. Las DNS contrastan con el funcionamiento de los anteriores "Estados desarrollistas burocráticos" de la era fordista, que aplicaban formas dirigistas de política industrial a través de un aparato burocrático centralizado y una dirección jerárquica de la economía. Por el contrario, los DNS fomentan la innovación tecnológica y el desarrollo económico en virtud de su integración en la sociedad (Evans, Citation1995).
Given the complexity and multidimensional nature of the knowledge bases required to innovate in today’s globalised knowledge economy (Fagerberg, Citation2006; Iversen & Soskice, Citation2019), technological breakthroughs increasingly occur via network collaborations among private and public actors (e.g., technologists, firms, universities, public agencies) (Block & Keller, Citation2009; Breznitz & Ornston, Citation2013; Maggor, Citation2021) and increasingly depend on firms' capacity to develop ‘collaborative advantages’ through cross-country production networks, where each firm specialises in given steps of the innovation and production process (Nahm, Citation2021). Public officials in DNSs thus operate closely with organised groups and civil society to identify and support the most promising avenues for innovation (Block, Citation2008, p. 172). DNSs aim to ‘shap[e] the capabilities of societal and market actors’ and are defined by their ability to ‘create and animate post-Fordist networks of production and innovation and link them together in ways that promote local and national development’ (O’Riain, Citation2000, p. 165). Activism by DNSs is desirable within today’s transnational production systems to overcome network failures, i.e., situations where production or innovation networks may be needed but fail to emerge due to information asymmetries or lack of trust among prospective partners (Negoita, Citation2014; Schrank & Whitford, Citation2011). To these ends, DNSs’ public officials operate through various developmental functions (see): targeted resourcing, brokering, facilitation. To these functions originally highlighted by Block (Citation2008)Footnote3, we add protection, a classic industrial policy function used by governments to nurture domestic industries while shielding them from foreign competition (Gourevitch, Citation1986).
Table 1. The four developmental functions of DNSs and the EU Commission’s functions.
La asignación de recursos específicos requiere que los funcionarios públicos consulten con la sociedad civil y la comunidad empresarial para identificar nuevos retos con vistas a proporcionar financiación a los agentes con proyectos que tengan más probabilidades de lograr innovaciones y avances tecnológicos. Esta función es especialmente importante cuando, debido a la naturaleza fundamentalmente incierta de la innovación, el mercado no proporciona capital inicial a los posibles innovadores (Mazzucato, Citation2013). Para lo que nos interesa aquí, por ejemplo, la Comisión proporciona financiación específica para la innovación a través de fondos gestionados directa o indirectamente y mediante financiación compartida con los Estados miembros (véasey la sección 5.2).
Brokering envisages states connecting scientists working in universities, government laboratories or business settings to stimulate innovation. Brokering involves setting up networks that enable technologists to connect with private or public investors to acquire the funding necessary to develop and commercialise products. Since 2017, the Commission has increasingly carried out brokering functions especially – although not only – via the formation of industrial alliances (see section 5.3).
Facilitation requires regulatory actions such as strategic re-regulation, standard setting or administrative simplifications which smoothen market actors’ operations and incentivise investments in new strategic sectors. Inter alia, the Commission increasingly facilitates national state aid provision through a revised framework for cross-national Important Projects of Common European Interest (IPCEIs) (see section 5.4).
Finally, protection implies measures like tariff or non-tariff regulatory barriers imposed by public authorities to protect domestic market actors from foreign competitors, e.g., for reasons of national security, unfair competition or simply to shield domestic economic actors from the competition of more technologically advanced nations or firms. In liaison with member states, the Commission progressively attempts to protect the EU single market through instruments such as the new public procurement and FDI-screening tools (see section 5.5).
We now turn to EU integration theories to elaborate testable hypotheses on the drivers and outcomes of integration for these four policy functions within Europe’s single market.
3.2 EU integration theory: theorising drivers and outcomes of policy integration
Por el contrario, el neofuncionalismo entiende la integración de la UE como un proceso incremental impulsado por actores interesados que forjan coaliciones transnacionales para buscar nuevas soluciones integradoras ante los problemas políticos emergentes (Haas, Citation1964; Niemann & Ioannou, Citation2015). Los procesos integradores pueden ser desencadenados por perturbaciones exógenas que ponen de manifiesto las insuficiencias y debilidades de la actual construcción de la UE; por ejemplo, la crisis de los refugiados (Genschel y Jachtenfuchs, Citation2018) o la pandemia COVID-19 (Brooks et al., Citation2022). Otra posibilidad es que los problemas surjan del propio proceso de integración de la UE debido a consecuencias imprevistas de decisiones integradoras anteriores. En tales casos, suele esperarse que los gobiernos cedan e integren el menor número posible de funciones políticas para mantener la soberanía nacional, pero tantas como sea necesario para abordar los problemas pendientes (Schmitter, Citation1970).
The process of integration is driven by functional, political, and cultivated spillover mechanisms. Functional spillovers occur when international economic interdependence makes national policymaking ineffective, calling for further supranational integration of policy domains. Political spillovers ensue when national stakeholders – governmental agents and/or organised interests – come to understand that new problems can no longer be dealt with at the domestic level. Thus, through a learning process, national elites gradually realise the need to "make use of Europe" (Woll & Jacquot, Citation2010) to effectively solve new problems. Cultivated spillovers are pro-integration initiatives pushed by supranational institutions. Motivated by a double interest in expanding competences and enhancing collective problem-solving capacity, supranational institutions – like the Commission – can devise new policy solutions and work to assemble transnational political coalitions in support of more integration.
Considering high economic integration in the Single Market and the EU constraints on national industrial and fiscal policy, one would readily expect a functional spillover to drive the integration of industrial policy at the EU level. After all, the inadequacies of EU institutions and policies have become apparent after the 2008 global financial crisis, and the need for industrial policy is today openly discussed at all levels in light of the rising innovation, climate and geopolitical challenges (Zeitlin et al., Citation2019). However, a functional spillover alone cannot explain the timing of this integration process. Rather, a more explicit relationship between the three spillover mechanisms must be formulated. Our insight is that, once a functional spillover creates a new need for more Europe (necessary condition), a political alignment between the Commission and national stakeholders is needed to move integration forward (sufficiency condition). This is especially the case in domains where the Commission requires cooperation from national actors to effect policymaking. New networked forms of industrial policy in the knowledge economy fall squarely within this realm given the dependency of DNSs on societal and economic actors for the pursuit of developmental aims. Thus, while we expect a competence-seeking Commission to exercise integration pressures through a cultivated spillover, the Commission remains largely dependent on the voluntary participation of national stakeholders in the execution of many decentralised and network-based industrial policies. We thus formulate our first hypothesis.
H1: Functional and cultivated spillovers are necessary, but not sufficient conditions for EU industrial policy to emerge. Integration of industrial policy is likely to accelerate when a political alignment occurs between the Commission and key national actors who realize the need for integrated EU-wide industrial policy (political spillover).
While the neofunctionalist literature has long theorised and analysed cases of EU integration based on supranational and intergovernmental governance, it has paid little attention to a third mode of transnational policymaking in the EU: network governance (Jones et al., Citation1997). Governance through networks consists of the 'articulation of interdependent, but operationally autonomous actors from the public and/or private sector’ (Torfing & Sørensen, Citation2014, p. 334). In the EU and the single market, this can occur when policy functions are governed neither via fully supranational nor strictly intergovernmental governance but via voluntary participation in trans-national networks of European stakeholders and when these networks are established and steered by an EU supranational authority. We thus extend the neofunctionalist literature by introducing a third type of integration outcome: network spillover. Network spillovers can occur in the EU when a policy domain is integrated beyond the nation-state but is governed via network governance. In such cases, supranational actors like the European Commission will act as honest brokers to foster the creation and sustenance of transnational networks of pan-European private and public actors aimed at achieving collectively desirable public policy outcomes. The proactive agency of the supranational authority is key to addressing information asymmetries widespread among cross-national economic actors, for stabilising expectations among network participants and generating trust among prospective participants, thus minimising the likelihood of network failures.
Nicoli (Citation2020) identifies three factors contributing to explaining variation across integration outcomes: (1) the degree of pre-existing policy integration; (2) the type of policy (low vs high politics domain); and (3) the likely effects of governance interdependence, distinguishing between problems of interdependence based on mismatches between national-supranational level policies (e.g., member states’ policies which distort the single market) versus problems of interdependence associated with collective action problems (e.g., free-riding or moral hazard) which generate externalities to the community.
Translated to the three types of integration outcomes, a spillover integration outcome is likely to occur when the supranational institution has already competence over a policy domain and enjoys powers to autonomously expand or reinterpret its mandate. A spillaround type of integration outcome is instead likely to occur under two scenarios. In high politics domains already integrated and governed through intergovernmentalism, spillaround occurs because governments will be inclined to strengthen/reinterpret EU authority to address new problems but will want to continue exercising oversight through joint decision-making in the highly sensitive policy domain. Alternatively, in high politics domains hitherto not integrated, spillaround is also likely as greater integration aims to minimise problems of interdependence while leaving room for member states’ oversight in decision-making. Lastly, network spillovers can be expected to occur in low-politics domains where, nonetheless, economic interdependence is high, and the high risk of collective action problems calls for the establishment of effective cooperative governance mechanisms that minimise and sanction free-riding behaviour. In this case, network-based forms of transnational governance, established and governed by a supranational broker, help to address information asymmetries, enhance trust and sanction malpractices, incentivising the voluntary participation of national stakeholders within transnational networks of governance.
Harnessing these theoretical insights, we develop a battery of expectations about the integration outcomes to be expected for the four industrial policy functions introduced above: targeted resourcing, brokering, facilitation and protection.
H2: Since the Commission shares budgeting authority (a high politics domain) with Member States that vote unanimously in the Council, we should expect a spillaround type of integration for the targeted resourcing function;
H3: Since innovation and production networks rest on the voluntary and mutual cooperation of cross-national public and private actors in the EU single market, we should expect a network spillover outcome of integration for the brokering function;
H4: Since the Commission has competence and autonomy in economic regulation and competition law, we should expect a spillover type of integration for the facilitation function;
H5: Since member states’ discretionary protection of domestic markets on security grounds (a high politics domain) is potentially highly distortive at the Union level, we should expect a spillaround type of integration for the protection function.
4 Data and methodology
Nuestra estrategia empírica se basa en una variante de la metodología de rastreo de procesos definida como análisis sistemático de procesos (Hall, Citation2006). Este método es especialmente adecuado en los diseños de investigación de NN pequeñas, en los que el investigador pretende ofrecer explicaciones históricas específicas del contexto que se desarrollan en un horizonte temporal determinado. Requiere que el investigador formule primero teorías que identifiquen las variables/condiciones y procesos que conducen al resultado de interés y, a continuación, deduzca hipótesis coherentes sobre los resultados y patrones que se validarán empíricamente. A continuación, se realizan observaciones mediante estudios de casos que aprovechan múltiples fuentes de pruebas pertinentes.
Accordingly, we test the above hypotheses by reconstructing the process of integration of EU industrial policy functions by triangulating primary and secondary sources. We combine 11 elite interviews with EU Commission’s officials in various Directorates-General (DGs) and officials in the top echelons of the German Economy Ministry (see Table A2 in the Appendix for details) with an in-depth analysis of the Commission’s industrial policy communications and other publicly available official documents (e.g., by the Council of the EU, the Friends of Industry meetings or by national ministries). We combine these primary sources with information from specialised news outlets and available academic literature. In the analysis, we do not assume nor treat the Commission as a single monolithic actor.Footnote4 Instead, when available, we provide specific information about the main actors and the various DGs involved in the process.
5 The rise of EU industrial policy
5.1 Desbordamiento político: El alineamiento de Francia y Alemania tras un nuevo consenso de política industrial
La política industrial de la UE no surgió bruscamente en la última década. Aun así, entre los años 80 y finales de los 2000, la política industrial de la UE era de carácter neoliberal y se centraba en medidas horizontales para mejorar las condiciones marco económicas. En resumen, tres pilares principales caracterizaron la política industrial de la UE durante este periodo (Landesmann & Stöllinger, Citation2020). En primer lugar, la creación y profundización del Programa del Mercado Único en 1987 constituyó la política marco por excelencia, fomentando la armonización normativa y una integración económica más profunda en toda la UE. En segundo lugar, se amplió y reforzó el alcance de la legislación de la UE en materia de competencia (es decir, las normas sobre ayudas estatales, el control de las fusiones y la contratación pública) para disciplinar la política industrial de los Estados miembros y garantizar la competencia y la igualdad de condiciones en el mercado único. En tercer lugar, existían algunas políticas y programas de diseño horizontal que apoyaban las colaboraciones en I+D como piedra angular de la política de innovación y tecnología de la UE, pero seguían siendo en gran medida periféricas (Landesmann & Stöllinger, Cita2020, p. 629).
National governments and the EU’s approach to industrial policy started to change in the aftermath of the great financial crisis, driven especially by France under the new Socialist government of François Hollande. Years of fiscal austerity, economic recession and high unemployment had engendered a reappraisal of industry’s centrality for economic prosperity, calling for a renewed emphasis on industrial policy for economic development (Cherif & Hasanov, Citation2019; Mosconi, Citation2015). In the summer of 2013, the French government presented its vision for ‘France in 10 years’ time’ (Financial Times, Citation2013). Faithful to its longstanding interventionist tradition, France’s vision revolved around a ‘pragmatic’ 10-year industrial policy agenda elaborated by industry minister, Arnaud Montebourg – fiercely committed to support France’s industry in its key innovative sectors (e.g., renewables, robotics, medical biotech), thereby boosting industrial output and employment (Government of France, Citation2013). Concomitantly, minister Mountebourg vocally attacked the EU regulatory state, denouncing the strict application of EU state aid rules as the factor preventing Europe from meeting mounting global competition in times of rapid technological change (Financial Times, Citation2014). Quite evocatively, Montebourg characterised the Commission’s approach to state aid limitations as ‘obsoletism, autism, imprisonment, fundamentalism’ and, in highlighting the generous state aid given by foreign governments to domestic industry, likened the situation in the EU single market to ‘Rome surrounded by the barbarians’ and awaiting to fall (Financial Times, Citation2014).
To build a transnational coalition of likeminded countries, in Autumn 2013, Montebourg set up the Friend of Industry (FoI) conference, a cross-national forum of EU economy ministers aimed at advocating for new forms of interventionist industrial policy and reforms of the EU’s regulatory straitjacket (see also Ambroziak, Citation2017, pp. 102–103). The first FoI’s joint declaration was signed in Paris by an initial group of nine member states: Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Spain, and the United Kingdom. In stressing the centrality of industry for EU prosperity, the Group advocated for the reform of ‘outdated’ state aid rules, the strengthening of European industrial value chains and greater screening and protection from unfair subsidies practiced outside the EU (Friends of industry, Citation2013). Put differently, countries in the FoI conference took stock of the ‘structural changes’ – climate and technological change and unfair international competition – to which EU countries and industry were exposed and started advocating vocally for an overhaul of extant EU policies and institutions that would put industry ‘at the heart of European decision-making’ (Friends of industry, Citation2014, p. 2) and promote and protect the EU single market.
Yet, while the number of countries joining the FoI’s yearly meetings grew in the subsequent years, Germany abstained repeatedly from signing the FoI’s joint declarations and its opposition to EU-level industrial policy de facto foreclosed any major reform steps. By increasing their public Communications on the subject, during the same years both the CouncilFootnote5 and the Commission showed a new penchant for a more ambitious European industrial policy. Until 2017, however, the Commission’s industrial policy Communications continue to envisage limited and horizontal regulatory initiatives (see
in the Appendix for an analytical overview), reflecting the conclusions reached by Competitiveness CouncilFootnote6 (COMPET), the ministerial body of the Council of the European Union.Footnote7
It is only after 2016/17 that the expansion and integration of industrial policy gained currency as a result of Germany’s momentous shift in favour of greater EU integration and coordination of industrial policy functions after the so-called ‘Kuka moment’ (Germann, Citation2022, p. 13). In truth, various factors concurred to trigger a reappraisal of industrial policy among German policymakers, business groups and public opinion alike. First, the election of President Donald Trump marked the beginning of protectionist trade policies in the U.S., hitherto the bastion of free trade in the international political economy (Ikenberry, Citation2018). Second, the UK vote for Brexit was going to deprive the EU of a heavyweight country historically leaning toward pro-market and anti-interventionist positions in EU economic governance (Meunier & Mickus, Citation2020; interview 8). But, most importantly for Germany’s domestic politics, the 2016 acquisition of the German word-leading robotics firm Kuka by state-backed Chinese investor Midea Group marked the tipping point of a five-year-long wave of Chinese acquisitions of highly innovative German companies (Financial Times, Citation2016a). The acquisition came as a shock, triggering a public debate on the future of German industry both in Berlin and Brussels (Financial Times, Citation2016b), revealing in full force the need for greater EU industrial policy.
The magnitude of the Kuka shock in triggering this change cannot be overstated (interview 9). Crucially, German policymakers realised they did not dispose of adequate legal means to screen and prevent foreign investments for geopolitical and national sovereignty concerns (interview 9). Similarly, government officials also started to worry about the long-term competitiveness of European industry in crucial sectors such as the automobile industry (interview 5; 7) and about unfair competition by foreign companies backed by generous state aid. These concerns were mirrored also in Brussels. As one EU Commission official put it: ‘you have countries out there like China […] – but the US as well – that do support very generously their industry, and they have very ambitious industrial policies in place … . So, we should also be less naive ourselves’ (interview 8). A pro-European industrial policy sentiment started to emerge in Germany’s public opinion too, due to the new need to stand up against Chinese aggressive takeovers. Indeed, Eurobarometer polls conducted prior to Kuka’s acquisition and two years after show a 15-point increase in public support for EU industrial policy in Germany (European Parliament Research Service, Citation2019, p. 3).
Germany’s U-turn on state activism is evident in its advocacy for a more ambitious EU industrial policy within COMPET (14343/16). Moreover, not only Germany starts signing the FoI’s joint declarations, the 2017 meeting is, in fact, summoned in Berlin. Speaking at the 2017 Berlin FoI’s meeting, German state Secretary Matthias Machnig openly urged the ‘need a strong industrial sector in Europe and a clear EU industry strategy with specific measures to boost the competitiveness of our industry’ and called ‘on the European Commission to quickly present such strategy’ indicating that a ‘strong European industrial sector and a clear stance on industrial policy also form part of our response in Europe to isolationist tendencies in other parts of the world’ (BMWK, Citation2017).
But the Franco-German alignment behind EU industrial policy has most explicitly materialised during the Franco-German Council of Ministers in July 2017. At the meeting, the two governments tasked their major business associations, MEDEF and BDI respectively, to cooperate in setting up working groups on, inter alia, industrial policy, climate change, trade and investment to bring forward recommendations for closer economic cooperation between the two countries. Early in 2018, BDI and MEDEF issued their joint recommendations for new initiatives on industrial economic cooperation between Germany and France. Business interests issued calls for a ‘new approach in the industrial policy of the European Union’ through the promotion of a modern manufacturing sector via EU targeted funding for ‘industrial investment, innovation and entrepreneurship’ and new initiatives to promote technological transfers, regulatory facilitation and standard setting (BDI and MEDEF, Citation2018).
The European Commission’s early 2019 decision to prohibit Siemens’ proposed acquisition of Alstom further contributed a sense of urgency in the overhaul of EU industrial policy (European Commission, Citation2019). Explicitly incorporating recommendations from the FoI and from the business groups, in 2019 France and Germany eventually issued a Franco-German Manifesto for a European industrial policy fit for the twenty-first Century. The manifesto paved the way for the integration of industrial policy functions at the EU level based on three pillars: (1) investing in and enabling innovation (through targeted funding and brokering); (2) Adapting the EU regulatory framework to the new global challenges (through regulatory facilitation favouring state aid and innovation); (3) Effecting measures to protect the EU single market (i.e. by protecting EU firms from foreign unfair competition).
In all, it is in the late 2010s that, reflecting a newly-found Franco-German consensus on EU industrial policy, the Commissions’ communications start to discuss more explicitly vertical and mission-oriented forms of industrial policy (interview 11).Footnote8 These developments corroborate our H1 above: in a neofunctionalist fashion, functional and cultivated spillovers pushed in the direction of further integration of industrial policy at the EU level. Yet, major changes have only been possible once Germany’s opposition to EU industrial policy was lifted (political spillover). Germany’s change of preferences was due to the realisation that major structural changes in the international political economy called for an overhaul of EU institutions and policies to promote and protect the EU’s industry, in Germany’s interest too. The following sections will now detail empirically the developments in each of the four developmental functions.
The most important direct form of targeted resourcing has generally consisted of funding for innovation, executed through resources earmarked in the multiannual financial framework (MFF) adopted unanimously by the Council after a conciliation phase between the Commission and the Parliament. Resources for research and innovation had already been increased gradually in the 2000s to comply with the Lisbon Agenda’s goal to make Europe ‘the world’s most competitive and innovative region’ (Aho, Citation2006, p. 13; Mosconi, Citation2022, p. 187). Yet, the budget for research and innovation has doubled from €55bn in the 2007–13 MFF to more than €95bn today, in the 2021–27 MFF. A qualitative shift from the Lisbon Agenda is also visible in the negotiation phase for the 2021–27 budget after the Commission issued a proposal based on the political agreement reached by member states in Bratislava (September 2016) and enshrined in the Rome Declaration (March 2017). Thus, the first long-term budget for the Union of 27 explicitly called for ‘a modern budget for a Union that protects, empowers, and defends’ (European Commission, Citation2018, emphasis added). The 2021–207 MFF revolves around the guiding principle, agreed by member states, of fostering ‘European added value’ as a response to technological and climate change and geopolitical instability. In the event, also the very logic behind targeted resourcing has changed. Horizon Europe now revolves around mission-oriented funding (Mazzucato, Citation2018), i.e., five missions increasing investment in areas such as research and innovation, digitalisation, security, and defence and specifically aimed at stimulating ecosystems and cross-national innovation networks. New programmes have also been launched under the Horizon umbrella, such as the European Innovation Council (established through a pilot phase in 2018), which supports game-changing innovations throughout the lifecycle from early-stage research, to proof of concept, technology transfer, and the financing and scale up of start-ups and SMEs.
But it is in shared funding where we have observed the greatest increase of resources targeted to industrial policy functions. The post-COVID European response has led to the creation of the NextGen EU funds, unlocking over €700bn in loans and grants. The magnitude of NextGen EU is unprecedented and the Commission has subsumed much of the resources disbursed through the Recovery and Resilience Funds (RRF) under an industrial policy logic. Thus, 37 per cent of funds must be spent on the green transition, and 21 per cent on digitalisation. Moreover, the RRFs are disbursed in tranches tied to a member state’s performance in the European Semester. As such, the RRF could be thought de facto as a new indirect instrument of EU industrial policy.
In sum, increased integration of targeted resources for industrial policy has occurred both via the strengthening of existing funding for innovation through the MFF and the creation of new programmes – such as the RRF – which, via shared funding, now provide greater resources for the funding of industrial policy aims. Although gradual improvements were already underway in the 2000s and early 2010s to shore up the Lisbon Agenda, transformative changes have precipitated later in the decade once a new industrial policy consensus could be found among member states. In line with our H2, integration in matters related to budgeting, a core state power (Genschel & Jachtenfuchs, Citation2018), has occurred via a spillaround mechanism where member states retain oversight over funds via unanimity voting in the MFF and via the national implementation of shared funds.
5.3 La intermediación en la innovación: un caso de desbordamiento de la red
It is only since 2017, however, that the Commission has thrown its full weight behind the need to broker innovation in the EU single market. It first launched the annual industry days, a forum to link up members of the business community, governments, and academia to discuss the state of European industry. But, most importantly, the Commission has started to broker cross-sectoral and cross-national industrial alliances that draw from and expand on the EIT's network alliances. The goal of these alliances is to spur innovation in existing sectors and build new capacities by forging pan-European production networks. The first of such examples has been the European Battery Alliance, which was formed in 2017 with the aim of uniting actors along the battery value chain. Since then, as summarised by
, seven new industrial alliances have been launched in the areas of hydrogen, ICT, semiconductors, cloud technology and raw materials, involving a plethora of various institutional and economic actors across the single market.
Table 2. Industrial alliances brokered by the EU Commission.
Commission officials are explicit about the network failures that motivate their brokering activity (Pichler et al., Citation2021) and adamantly stress that it was ‘quite an important role for us [the Commission] to be able to play as a neutral broker on this’ (Interview 7). As with the first Alliance on batteries launched in 2017, officials from the Commission’s DG GROW realised that, by itself, ‘the market was not delivering’ and the Commission wanted to make sure ‘Europe is at least a player’ in the battery market (interview 7). In the words of the former Energy Commissioner Maros Sefcovic, Commission officials had to step in ‘to use the convening power of the European Commission to get the right people in the room’ with an eye to establishing pan-European networks of battery production (cited in Financial Times, Citation2019).
Overall, since 2017 the brokering function has undergone a steady integration via the establishment of several production and innovation networks under the convening agency of the EU Commission which now operates and perceives itself as a full-fledged ‘honest broker’ to address network failures in the EU single market. These developments seemingly corroborate our H3.
In the early 2010s, the push for IPCEIs was led by DG Connect and DG GROW, where policy officials were concerned about the laggard status of European industry in key growth areas such as batteries and microchips (interview 7). The absence of investment and network coordination were deemed market failures that particularly needed state involvement to be resolved (interview 8). As part of a broader initiative to modernise the EU’s state-aid and competition policy in the 2010s, DG Comp worked to formalise the eligibility criteria that classify the instances in which member states can deviate ‘orderly’ from state aid prohibitions for developmental aims. The Commission chief aim was to enable member states to intervene selective in the national economy while trying to preserve the overall integrity of the single market (interview 6). As put by a Commission official involved in the process: regarding article 107(3), ‘member states at the time, generally speaking, were not really aware of this legal basis, because it was not broadly used in the past’ (interview 8). This changed in 2014 when the Commission adopted a communication instructing member states on how to initiate the development of cross-national collaborative projects promoting common European interests.Footnote10 With the introduction of the IPCEI framework, the era of unfettered pursuit of a level playing-field is increasingly making way for a more sector-driven, mission-oriented, and less horizontal European industrial policy. IPCEIs satisfied member state demands for ‘other instruments, not only regulation, but also financial instruments […] where you can get money without state aid problems’ (interview 11).
IPCEIs differ from post-WWII dirigiste industrial policy because of their networked and cross-national nature. To qualify as a project of common European interest, in fact, an IPCEI must minimally involve four Member States. Moreover, the governance of the IPCEI must include a wide range of European stakeholders, including SMEs, who must be invited to participate. Lastly, the project must promise to generate measurable benefits to EU markets and societies, unleashing positive spillovers beyond the Member States and the undertakings involved. In other words, through its facilitating function, the Commission is de facto operating as a DNS in the single market, actively trying to foster the emergence of pan-European innovation networks thanks to the strategic re-regulation of the EU state aid framework towards what Commission officials understand as 'positive flexibility’ (interview 8).
Similar to the other industrial policy functions, these developments have accelerated in the late mid-2010s once a new industrial policy consensus has emerged. The first project in microelectronics was launched in 2018, with France and Germany playing a major convening role in mobilising other member states and industry stakeholders (interview 9). Since then, five more IPCEIs have been launched in key sectors such as battery production and hydrogen, involving a plethora of member states and various European stakeholders (see
), while partnerships on cloud computing and solar energy, health, and low-carbon industries are in the pipeline (Eisl, Citation2022, p. 5).
Table 3. Initiatives undertaken through the IPCEI framework.
In all, facilitating national industrial policy increasingly takes place at the EU level where, in line with our H4, the Commission has expanded and reinterpreted its functions (spillover) thanks to its competence and autonomy in economic regulation and competition law.
In response to the ‘big wake-up call for the EU’ provided by geopolitical turmoil (Interview 3) and following the explicit requests of France and Germany, the Commission has recently introduced a set of protective instruments. Most importantly, in 2019 the Commission adopted the EU's framework for the coordination of foreign direct investment (FDI) screening, resulting from a February 2017 request by the governments of France, Germany, and Italy (BMWE, Citation2017). The regulation gives the Commission powers to lay out minimal requirements for the establishment of member states' screening mechanisms and a tool for the coordination of national FDI reviews, but leaves the final decision-making power on FDIs to member states. Twenty-four Member states have since implemented national investment screening mechanisms (Modrall, Citation2022). Additionally, in 2021 the Commission proposed regulation to investigate potentially distorting foreign subsidies to protect the level playing-field between EU and non-EU market actors, for instance within the European market for public procurement. Additionally, as of spring 2023, the EU Commission, the European Parliament and the Council are deliberating on the creation of an Anti-Coercion Instrument (ACI) with the aim of counteracting third countries’ attempts to muscle EU member states into altering their sovereign choices under the threat of measures affecting trade or investment (European Commission, Citation2022, pp. 10–11). Not surprisingly given the high stakes linked to security concerns, the Council’s position in late 2022 proposes to scale down the Commission’s authority and envisages an intergovernmental decision-making procedure to govern the ACI based on qualified majority voting (Euractiv, Citation2022).
In all, while the Commission and the member states have stepped up their efforts to coordinate new protective initiatives and tools in the single market, their implementation and oversight continues to remain at the national level. As such, developments confirm our H5 whereby attempts at greater pan-European coordination of protective measures conform to a spillaround logic of integration: member states have increasingly tried to coordinate their responses to extra-EU unfair competition while keeping oversight over the discretionary protection of domestic markets on security and sovereignty grounds.
Conclusiones
El
objetivo de este artículo era dar cuenta de las causas próximas que
subyacen al auge de la política industrial de la UE desde mediados de la
década de 2010, tanto en lo que respecta a su calendario como a los
modos de gobernanza de las diversas funciones de la política industrial.
A través de la lente del Estado de la Red de Desarrollo (DNS) (Block,
Citation2008; O'Riain, Citation2000), hemos sistematizado y rastreado
las numerosas iniciativas fragmentadas de política industrial llevadas a
cabo por la Comisión, el poder ejecutivo de la UE con un mandato basado
en un tratado para llevar a cabo la política industrial europea. Este
marco analítico nos permite poner de relieve cómo la Comisión actúa cada
vez más para promover y proteger el mercado único a través de cuatro
funciones de desarrollo: proporcionando recursos específicos en apoyo de
la innovación tecnológica; actuando como intermediaria en las redes
paneuropeas de innovación y producción; promulgando una nueva regulación
económica estratégica para relajar las restricciones normativas de la
UE y facilitar la política industrial y las ayudas estatales nacionales y
transnacionales; y protegiendo el mercado único de la competencia
extranjera desleal y de la influencia extranjera indebida sobre los
Estados y las empresas europeas.
El
auge de la política industrial de la UE, encarnado por el conjunto de
estas cuatro funciones de política industrial, puede explicarse mejor a
través de la teoría neofuncionalista de la integración de la UE. Desde
mediados de la década de 2010, la expansión constante de nuevas
iniciativas de política industrial de la UE ha estado impulsada, desde
el punto de vista político, por un consenso recientemente alcanzado
entre Alemania y Francia sobre la necesidad de formas más integradas y
coordinadas de política industrial, necesarias para que los Estados
miembros de la UE puedan hacer frente a importantes retos de la economía
política internacional, a saber: los desafíos medioambientales y
tecnológicos, el creciente proteccionismo económico y la agitación
geopolítica. Las cuatro funciones de desarrollo de la política
industrial de la UE se han integrado y se rigen por diferentes modos de
gobernanza. Las funciones específicas de dotación de recursos y
protección siguen siendo en gran medida intergubernamentales, mientras
que la facilitación es el resultado de la agencia y la gobernanza
supranacionales de la Comisión. La función de intermediación se basa en
la gobernanza de la red, y la agencia supranacional de la Comisión es
clave para superar los fallos de la red en todo el mercado único de la
UE. Diversos factores, extraídos de los recientes avances de la teoría
neofuncionalista (Nicoli, Citation2020), ayudan a explicar la variación
de estos modos de gobernanza: es decir, el grado de integración política
preexistente, el tipo de política (de baja o alta política) y los tipos
de externalidades derivadas de la interdependencia de gobernanza de
diversas políticas.
El
creciente activismo económico de la Comisión es un fenómeno reciente
pero importante, que debe estudiarse junto con los esfuerzos
concomitantes para gobernar los mercados en Europa, desde la política
monetaria no convencional del BCE (van 't Klooster, Citation2021) y su
búsqueda de reformas estructurales que mejoren el mercado (Braun et al.,
Citation2021) hasta la unión del mercado de capitales de Europa (Braun
& Hübner, Citation2018) y la banca promocional europea y nacional
(Mertens et al., Citation2021; Mertens & Thiemann, Citation2019). El
auge de la política industrial de la UE marca un cambio importante
-aunque todavía incompleto y en curso- en la gobernanza económica de la
UE. Si, en el pasado, la Comisión podía describirse como el agente de la
integración potenciadora del mercado (Höpner & Schäfer,
Citation2012) dentro del Estado regulador de la UE, nuestro análisis
sugiere que la Comisión opera hoy cada vez más como agente de la
integración configuradora del mercado, tratando proactivamente de
corregir, configurar y proteger el mercado único de la UE para el
cumplimiento de los objetivos de política pública decididos
políticamente. No cabe duda de que el Estado regulador de la UE no ha
muerto. Sin embargo, en Europa se observa un proceso de cambio gradual y
posiblemente transformador, en virtud del cual se están creando nuevas
instituciones, políticas y programas para llevar a cabo funciones de
política industrial y de desarrollo orientadas al futuro, a la misión y
sectoriales, en lugar de retrospectivas y horizontales.
Sin
embargo, aunque retos externos como el imperialismo económico de China y
el creciente proteccionismo de EE.UU. exigen un mayor activismo
económico y una mayor integración de la política industrial en la UE,
aún no ha surgido una política industrial de la UE en toda regla. Los
estudiosos siguen cuestionando la adecuación y la eficacia de la
panoplia de iniciativas y programas de política industrial de la UE,
destacando las críticas relacionadas con la insuficiente financiación de
la UE para la política industrial y una excesiva fragmentación, y a
veces incoherencia, de los programas políticos existentes (Pianta et
al., Citation2020; Redeker, Citation2021; Wigger, Citation2022). Además,
las medidas actuales, como el marco de las IPCEI, parecen favorecer
sistemáticamente a los Estados más ricos y grandes con mayor capacidad
organizativa y financiera para poner en marcha IPCEI (Eisl,
Citation2022). En la misma línea, los "marcos temporales" de la Comisión
adoptados tras el brote de COVID-19 y la invasión rusa de Ucrania para
permitir a los Estados miembros ayudar a los productores nacionales en
dificultades ponen en peligro la integridad del mercado único. De hecho,
con una mayor capacidad fiscal, Alemania y Francia por sí solas han
sido responsables de casi el 80% de todas las ayudas estatales a las que
ha dado luz verde la Comisión (Financial Times, Cita2023b).
En consecuencia, la Comisión se enfrenta a un dilema sin precedentes.
-Por un lado, dada la creciente competencia extracomunitaria de China y EE.UU., se ve presionada para permitir cada vez más ayudas estatales nacionales intracomunitarias. Así lo indican, por ejemplo, las nuevas directrices de la Comisión para permitir la financiación pública antirreubicación de proyectos ecológicos cuando se ofrezcan incentivos similares fuera de Europa (Financial Times, Cita2023a).
- Por otro, sin embargo, abstenerse de aplicar las ayudas estatales conduce a una fragmentación sin precedentes del mercado único en favor de los Estados más ricos y grandes. Tal y como defiende la Presidenta de la Comisión Europea, Ursula von der Leyen (Citation2023), una salida a este enigma podría ser la creación de un fondo europeo de soberanía, que reúna recursos fiscales a nivel supranacional para llevar a cabo una política industrial de la UE en toda regla. Sin embargo, si el análisis neofuncionalista de este artículo es correcto, será difícil vencer la resistencia de los Estados miembros a una mayor integración fiscal para llevar a cabo la política industrial de la UE. Pero quizá no sea imposible, dada la plétora de retos a los que se enfrenta Europa en la actualidad
------
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13501763.2023.2202684
We build on Developmental Network State (DNS) literature (O’Riain, Block) showing how modern industrial policy addresses market and network failures in a globalized economy. We suggest that the COM increasingly tries to operate developmental functions akin to those of DNSs
Specifically, the EU COM conducts industrial policy through (1) targeted resourcing, (2) brokering (e.g. public-private industrial alliances), (3) facilitation (e.g., state aid regulation), and (4) protection. For an overview
U industrial policy initiatives have accelerated since 2016/17. We trace this to realigning French and German economic interests in light of the Chinese acquisition of robotics firm Kuka and industrial competitiveness concerns related to EU manufacturing and green industries
Among other things, the EU Commission has stepped up its efforts to broker transnational industrial alliances between business, research, and public actors from across the single market in strategic value chains. For an overview
The COM has also repurposed its EU state aid framework to facilitate and promote national industrial policy. Through Important Projects of Common European Interest (IPCEs), selected industries and firms can be supported beyond normal state aid restrictions. An overview
In sum, not all EU industrial policies are created equally: facilitation is supranational, budgeting and protection intergovernmental, brokering occurs through pan- network governance steered by EU COM. More in the paper about factors accounting for this variation
Our paper adds to others (e.g.@jvtklooster@BJMbraun) showing that a departure from "market-enhancing integration" is somehow possible without treaty change. Yet, the regulatory state is not dead: we are still far from a full-fledged, coherent, EU industrial policy
Geopolitica
La guerra de los subsidios desatada por EE UU pone a Europa contra las cuerdas
https://articulosclaves.blogspot.com/2023/03/la-guerra-de-los-subsidios-desatada-por.html
https://articulosclaves.blogspot.com/2023/05/europa-primero-el-auge-de-la-politica.html
https://articulosclaves.blogspot.com/2023/04/mi-opinion-sobre-china-y-las-relaciones.html
https://articulosclaves.blogspot.com/2023/04/repowereu-o-como-acelerar-la-transicion.html
https://brujulaeconomica.blogspot.com/2021/10/geopolitica-y-el-retorno-de-los-shocks.html
China-Rusia
https://articulosclaves.blogspot.com/2023/03/china-y-rusia-una-pareja-de-hecho.html
https://articulosclaves.blogspot.com/2023/04/la-disyuntiva-de-europa-sobre-china.html
https://articulosclaves.blogspot.com/2023/05/china-quiere-ser-una-civilizacion.html
Geoeconomia
https://articulosclaves.blogspot.com/2023/03/sistema-economico-mundial-y.html
https://articulosclaves.blogspot.com/2023/04/un-nuevo-multilateralismo-comercial.html
https://articulosclaves.blogspot.com/2023/04/la-tecnologia-se-topa-con-la-geografia.html
https://brujulaeconomica.blogspot.com/2019/09/la-clave-geoeconomia-geopolitica-china.html
https://articulosclaves.blogspot.com/2023/04/la-cara-oculta-del-negocio-de-las.html
https://articulosclaves.blogspot.com/2023/04/el-abrazo-deflacionario-entre-las.html
https://articulosclaves.blogspot.com/2023/05/la-industria-de-los-semiconductores-y.html
https://articulosclaves.blogspot.com/2023/05/quien-controla-los-semiconductores.html
Politica industrial
https://articulosclaves.blogspot.com/2023/03/la-industria-espanola-vs-las-politicas.html
https://articulosclaves.blogspot.com/2023/05/politica-industrial-sabremos-pasar-de.html
Europa y politica industrial
https://articulosclaves.blogspot.com/2023/04/y-si-airbus-fuera-el-modelo-seguir-para.html
https://brujulaeconomica.blogspot.com/2023/03/la-necesidad-de-una-politica-industrial.html
Fondos europeos
https://articulosclaves.blogspot.com/2023/04/una-mejor-gestion-de-los-fondos-europeos.html
https://articulosclaves.blogspot.com/2023/04/el-green-deal-europeo-entre-lo-deseable.html
Transicion cambios tecnologicos.Cambios disruptivos
https://articulosclaves.blogspot.com/2023/05/el-ordenador-cuantico-es-la-nueva.html
https://articulosclaves.blogspot.com/2023/04/cambio-tecnologico-y-progreso-social-es.html
https://articulosclaves.blogspot.com/2023/05/una-pequena-gran-revolucion-tecnologica.html
https://forosenar.blogspot.com/2023/05/1the-future-of-jobs-report-2023.html
Competicion tecnologica
https://articulosclaves.blogspot.com/2023/04/la-competicion-tecnologica.html
Caso España
https://brujulaeconomica.blogspot.com/2021/09/una-nueva-politica-industrial-para.html
https://brujulaeconomica.blogspot.com/2022/04/reindustrializacion-de-espana.html
https://articulosclaves.blogspot.com/2023/04/korea-vs-spain.html
https://brujulaeconomica.blogspot.com/2020/06/politica-industrial-el-regreso.html
References
- Aggarwal, V. K., & Reddie, A. W. (2020). New economic statecraft: Industrial policy in an era of strategic competition. Issues & Studies, 56(02), 2040006. https://doi.org/10.1142/S1013251120400068 [Crossref], [Google Scholar]
- Aho, E. (2006). Creating an innovative Europe: Report of the independent expert group on R&D and innovation. Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. [Google Scholar]
- Alami, I., Dixon, A. D., Gonzalez-Vicente, R., Babic, M., Lee, S.-O., Medby, I. A., & de Graaff, N. (2021). Geopolitics and the ‘new’state capitalism. Geopolitics, 27(3), 995–1023. https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2021.1924943 [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]
- Ambroziak, A. A. (2017). State Aid policy and industrial policy of the European union. In A. A. Ambroziak (Ed.), The New industrial policy of the European union (pp. 87–111). Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-39070-3_4. [Crossref], [Google Scholar]
- BDI and MEDEF. (2018). Recommendations for new initiatives in industrial economic cooperation between Germany and France. https://urbis.europarl.europa.eu/urbis/sites/default/files/generated/document/en/201. [Google Scholar]
- Bianchi, P., & Labory, S. (2020). European industrial policy: A comparative perspective. In The Oxford handbook of industrial policy, 593–620. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198862420.013.22. [Google Scholar]
- Bickerton, C. J., Hodson, D., & Puetter, U. (2015). The New intergovernmentalism and the study of European integration. In C. J. Bickerton, D. Hodson, & U. Puetter (Eds.), The New intergovernmentalism (pp. 1–48). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198703617.003.0001. [Crossref], [Google Scholar]
- Billows, Sebastian, Sebastian Kohl, and Fabien Tarissan. 2021. ‘Bureaucrats or ideologues? EU merger control as market-centred integration.’ JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 59(4): 762–781. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.13130 [Crossref], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]
- Block, F. (2008). Swimming against the current: The rise of a hidden developmental state in the United States. Politics & Society, 36(2), 169–206. https://doi.org/10.1177/0032329208318731 [Crossref], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]
- Block, F., & Keller, M. R. (2009). Where Do innovations come from? Transformations in the US economy, 1970–2006. Socio-Economic Review, 7(3), 459–483. https://doi.org/10.1093/ser/mwp013 [Crossref], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]
- BMWE. (2017). Letter to Cecilia Malmström. https://www.bmwk.de/Redaktion/DE/Downloads/S-T/schreiben-de-fr-it-an-malmstroem.pdf?__blob = publicationFile&v = 4. [Google Scholar]
- BMWK. (2017). Machnig: ‘Europe needs a strong industrial sector and a clear EU Industry strategy.’ BMWK Press Release. https://www.bmwk.de/Navigation/EN/Topic/Functions/Redaktion/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2017/20170630-machnig-europa-braucht-starke-industrie.html. [Google Scholar]
- Braun, Benjamin, Di Carlo, Donato, Diessner, Sebastian, & Düsterhöft, Maximilian. (2021). Between governability and legitimacy: The ECB and structural reforms. SocArXiv. https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/dp3nv [Google Scholar]
- Braun, B., & Hübner, M. (2018). Fiscal fault, financial fix? Capital markets union and the quest for macroeconomic stabilization in the euro area. Competition & Change, 22(2), 117–138. https://doi.org/10.1177/1024529417753555 [Crossref], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]
- Breznitz, D., & Ornston, D. (2013). The revolutionary power of peripheral agencies: Explaining radical policy innovation in Finland and Israel. Comparative Political Studies, 46(10), 1219–1245. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414012472466 [Crossref], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]
- Brooks, E., de Ruijter, A., Greer, S. L., & Rozenblum, S. (2022). EU health policy in the aftermath of COVID-19: Neofunctionalism and crisis-driven integration. Journal of European Public Policy, 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2022.2141301 [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]
- Bulfone, F. (2019). The state strikes back: Industrial policy, regulatory power and the divergent performance of telefonica and telecom Italia. Journal of European Public Policy, 26(5), 752–771. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2018.1459790 [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]
- Bulfone, F. (2022). Industrial policy and comparative political economy: A literature review and research agenda. Competition & Change. https://doi.org/10.1177/10245294221076225. [Crossref], [Google Scholar]
- Bulfone, F., & Di Carlo, D. (2021). Privatization, crisis, and the transformation of cassa depositi e prestiti. In Daniel Mertens, Matthias Thiemann, & Peter Volberding (Eds.), The reinvention of development banking in the European union (pp. 144–171). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198859703.003.0006. [Crossref], [Google Scholar]
- Cherif, R., & Hasanov, F. (2019). The return of the policy that shall not be named: Principles of industrial policy. IMF Working Paper No. 2019/074. https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/WP/2019/WPIEA2019074.ashx. [Google Scholar]
- Defraigne, J.-C., Wouters, J., Traversa, E., & Zurstrassen, D.2022). EU industrial policy in the multipolar economy. Leuven global governance series. Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. [Google Scholar]
- Dewey, M., & Di Carlo, D. (2021). Governing through non-enforcement: regulatory forbearance as industrial policy in advanced economies. Regulation & Governance n/a (n/a). https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12382. [Crossref], [Google Scholar]
- Eichengreen, B. (2008). The European economy since 1945: Coordinated capitalism and beyond. Princeton University Press. [Crossref], [Google Scholar]
- Eisl, A. (2022). EU industrial policy in the making. Jacques Delors. Institute Policy Paper No286 / December 2022. https://institutdelors.eu/wp-content/uploads/dlm_uploads/2022/12/PP286_EU-industrial-policy-in-the-making_Eisl_EN.pdf. [Google Scholar]
- Euractiv. (2022). EU member states clip Commission wings in anti-coercion tool discussions. Euractiv, November 16th, 2022. https://www.euractiv.com/section/economy-jobs/news/eu-member-states-clip-commission-wings-in-anti-coercion-tool-discussions/. [Google Scholar]
- European Commission. (2018). EU budget: Commission proposes a modern budget for a union that protects, empowers and defends. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_18_3570. [Google Scholar]
- European Commission. (2019). EU industrial policy after siemens-alstom: Finding a new balance between openness and protection. European Political Strategy Centre, Publications Office. https://doi.org/10.2872/153809. [Google Scholar]
- European Commission. (2022). Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of the Union and its Member States from economic coercion by third countries. COM(2021) 775 final. [Google Scholar]
- European Council. (2020). European Council conclusions, 1-2 October 2020. [Crossref], [Google Scholar]
- European Parliament. (2022). Important projects of common European interest: State of play. European Parliament Research Service. 2019. ‘Industrial Policy’. [Google Scholar]
- European Parliament Research Service. (2019). Industrial Policy: state of play. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/630309/EPRS_BRI(2018)630309_EN.pdf. [Google Scholar]
- Evans, P. (1995). Embedded autonomy. Princeton University Press. [Crossref], [Google Scholar]
- Fagerberg, J. (2006). Innovation: A guide to the literature. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199286805.003.0001. [Google Scholar]
- Financial Times. (2013). Ministers set out Utopian but hazy vision of a strong France. Financial Times, August. [Google Scholar]
- Financial Times. (2014). French industry minister assails Brussels on state aid for industry. Financial Times, January. [Google Scholar]
- Financial Times. (2016a). Berlin and Brussels wary of Chinese robotics bid. Financial Times, June. [Google Scholar]
- Financial Times. (2016b). German angst over Chinese M&A. Financial Times, August. [Google Scholar]
- Financial Times. (2019). Europe first: How Brussels is retooling industrial policy. Financial Times, December. https://www.ft.com/content/140e560e-0ba0-11ea-bb52-34c8d9dc6d84. [Google Scholar]
- Financial Times. (2023a). EU opens subsidy race with us to fight exodus of green projects. Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/a7438c5a-41da-42ab-845f-25176205a5c7. [Google Scholar]
- Financial Times. (2023b). Can the EU keep up with the US on Green subsidies? Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/85b55126-e1e6-4b2c-8bb2-753d3cafcbe5. [Google Scholar]
- Fioretos, O. (2001). The domestic sources of multilateral preferences: Varieties of capitalism in the European community. In P. A. Hall, & D. Soskice (Eds.), Varieties of capitalism (pp. 213–244). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/0199247757.003.0006. [Crossref], [Google Scholar]
- Friends of Industry. (2013). Joint communiqué at the occasion of the first ministerial conference of friends of industry, Paris 23rd October 2013. http://proxy-pubminefi.diffusion.finances.gouv.fr/pub/document/18/16140.pdf. [Google Scholar]
- Friends of Industry. (2014). Joint Communication Second European Ministerial Conference of Friends of Industry. https://www.mise.gov.it/images/stories/documenti/Final_Declaration_rev.pdf. [Google Scholar]
- Genschel, P., & Jachtenfuchs, M. (2018). From market integration to core state powers: The eurozone crisis, the refugee crisis and integration theory. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 56(1), 178–196. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12654 [Crossref], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]
- Germann, J. (2022). Global rivalries, corporate interests and Germany’s ‘national industrial strategy 2030. Review of International Political Economy, 1–27. https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2022.2130958 [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]
- Gourevitch, P. (1986). Politics in hard times: Comparative responses to international economic crises. Cornell University Press. [Google Scholar]
- Government of France. (2013). Déclaration de M. François Hollande, Président de La République, Sur Les Priorités de Politique Industrielle de La France. https://www.viepublique.fr/discours/188996-francois-hollande-12092013-priorites-de-politique-industriellefrance. [Google Scholar]
- Granieri, M., & Renda, A. (2012). Innovation Law and policy in the European union. Springer Milan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-88-470-1917-1. [Crossref], [Google Scholar]
- Haas, E. B. (1964). Beyond the nation-state: Functionalism & international organization. Stanford University Press. [Google Scholar]
- Hall, P. A. (2006). Systematic process analysis: When and how to use it. European Management Review, 3(1), 24–31. https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.emr.1500050 [Crossref], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]
- Haroche, P. (2020). Supranationalism strikes back: A neofunctionalist account of the European defence fund. Journal of European Public Policy, 27(6), 853–872. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2019.1609570 [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]
- Haroche, P. (2022). A ‘geopolitical commission’: Supranationalism meets global power competition. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.13440 [Crossref], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]
- Hay, C. (2020). Globalization’s impact on states. In John Ravenhill (Ed.), Global political economy (pp. 282–310). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/hepl/9780198820642.003.0011. [Crossref], [Google Scholar]
- Höpner, M., & Schäfer, A. (2012). Embeddedness and regional integration: Waiting for polanyi in a hayekian setting. International Organization, 66(3), 429–455. https://doi.org/10.1017/S002081831200015X [Crossref], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]
- Ikenberry, G. J. (2018). The End of liberal international order? International Affairs, 94(1), 7–23. https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iix241. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]
- Iversen, T., & Soskice, D. (2019). Democracy and prosperity: Reinventing capitalism through a turbulent century. Princeton University Press. [Google Scholar]
- Jabko, N. (2006). Playing the market: A political strategy for uniting Europe, 1985–2005. Cornell University Press. [Google Scholar]
- Jones, C., Hesterly, W. S., & Borgatti, S. P. (1997). A general theory of network governance: Exchange conditions and social mechanisms. The Academy of Management Review, 22(4), 911. https://doi.org/10.2307/259249 [Crossref], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]
- Jones, E., Kelemen, D., & Meunier, S. (2021). Failing forward? Crises and patterns of European integration. Journal of European Public Policy, 28(10), 1519–1536. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2021.1954068 [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]
- Landesmann, M. A., & Stöllinger, R. (2020). The European union’s industrial policy. In Arkebe Oqubay, Christopher Cramer, Ha-Joon Chang, & Richard Kozul-Wright (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of industrial policy (pp. 620–660). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198862420.013.23. [Google Scholar]
- Leceta, J. M., & Könnölä, T. (2021). Fostering entrepreneurial innovation ecosystems: Lessons learned from the European institute of innovation and technology. Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research, 34(4), 475–494. https://doi.org/10.1080/13511610.2019.1612737 [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]
- Levi-Faur, D. (2009). Regulatory capitalism and the reassertion of the public interest. Policy and Society, 27(3), 181–191. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polsoc.2008.10.002 [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]
- Levy, J. D. (ed.). (2006). The state after statism: New state activities in the Age of liberalization. Harvard University Press. [Crossref], [Google Scholar]
- Maggor, E. (2021). The politics of innovation policy: Building Israel’s ‘Neo-developmental’ state. Politics & Society, 49(4), 451–487. https://doi.org/10.1177/0032329220945527 [Crossref], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]
- Majone, G. (1997). From the positive to the regulatory state: Causes and consequences of changes in the mode of governance. Journal of Public Policy, 17(2), 139–167. https://www.jstor.org/stable/4007608 [Crossref], [Google Scholar]
- Mazzucato, M. (2013). The entrepreneurial state: Debunking public Vs. Private sector myths. Anthem Press. [Google Scholar]
- Mazzucato, M. (2018). Mission-Oriented research & innovation in the European union: A problem solving approach to fuel innovation Led growth. Publications Office. https://doi.org/10.2777/360325. [Google Scholar]
- Mertens, D., & Thiemann, M. (2019). Building a hidden investment state? The European investment bank, national development banks and European economic governance. Journal of European Public Policy, 26(1), 23–43. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2017.1382556 [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]
- Mertens, D., Thiemann, M., & Volberding, P. (eds.). (2021). The reinvention of development banking in the European union: Industrial policy in the single market and the emergence of a field. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198859703.001.0001. [Crossref], [Google Scholar]
- Meunier, S., & Mickus, J. (2020). Sizing up the competition: Explaining reform of European union competition policy in the COVID-19 Era. Journal of European Integration, 42(8), 1077–1094. https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2020.1852232 [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]
- Modrall, J. (2022). EU regulation on foreign direct investment screening. Norton Rose Fullbright. https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/en/knowledge/publicationregulation-on-foreign-direct-investment-screening. [Google Scholar]
- Moravcsik, A. (1998). The choice for Europe: Social purpose and state power from Messina to Maastricht (1st ed). Cornell University Press. [Google Scholar]
- Mosconi, F. (2015). The New European industrial policy: Global competitiveness and the manufacturing renaissance. Routledge. [Crossref], [Google Scholar]
- Mosconi, F. (2022). European industrial policy from 2000 to 2020. In J.-C. Defraigne, J. Wouters, E. Traversa, & D. Zurstrassen (Eds.), In EU industrial policy in the multipolar economy (pp. 179–209). Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. [Google Scholar]
- Nahm, Jonas. (2021). Collaborative Advantage: Forging Green Industries in the New Global Economy. New York: Oxford University Press. [Crossref], [Google Scholar]
- Negoita, M. (2014). Globalization, state, and innovation: An appraisal of networked industrial policy. Regulation & Governance, 8(3), 371–393. https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12033 [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]
- Nicoli, F. (2020). Neofunctionalism revisited: Integration theory and varieties of outcomes in the eurocrisis. Journal of European Integration, 42(7), 897–916. https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2019.1670658 [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]
- Niemann, A., & Ioannou, D. (2015). European economic integration in times of crisis: A case of neofunctionalism? Journal of European Public Policy, 22(2), 196–218. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2014.994021 [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]
- O’Riain, S. (2000). The flexible developmental state: Globalization, information technology, and the ‘Celtic Tiger’. Politics & Society, 28(2), 157–193. https://doi.org/10.1177/0032329200028002002 [Crossref], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]
- O’Riain, S. (2004). The Politics of High Tech Growth: Developmental Network States in the Global Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Presshttps://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511499609 [Crossref], [Google Scholar]
- Pianta, M., Lucchese, M., & Nascia, L. (2020). The policy space for a novel industrial policy in Europe. Industrial and Corporate Change, 29(3), 779–795. https://doi.org/10.1093/icc/dtz075 [Crossref], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]
- Pichler, M., Krenmayr, N., Schneider, E., & Brand, U. (2021). EU industrial policy: Between modernization and transformation of the automotive industry. Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions, 38(March), 140–152. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eist.2020.12.002 [Crossref], [Google Scholar]
- Prontera, A., & Quitzow, R. (2022). The EU as catalytic state? Rethinking European climate and energy governance. New Political Economy, 27(3), 517–531. https://doi.org/10.1080/13563467.2021.1994539 [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]
- Redeker, N. (2021). After the German Election What’s Next in EU Industrial Policy? Jaques Delors Centre Policy Brief, 6. [Google Scholar]
- Ruggie, J. G. (1982). International regimes, transactions, and change: Embedded liberalism in the postwar economic order. International Organization, 36(2), 379–415. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2706527 [Crossref], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]
- Scharpf, F. W. (1998). Negative and positive integration in the political economy of European welfare states. In M. Rhodes, & Y. Mény (Eds.), The future of European welfare: A New social contract? (pp. 157–177). Palgrave Macmillan UK. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-34926543-5_8. [Crossref], [Google Scholar]
- Scharpf, F. W. (1999). Governing in Europe: Effective and democratic? Oxford University Press. [Crossref], [Google Scholar]
- Schmitter, P. C. (1970). A revised theory of regional integration. International Organization, 24(4), 836–868. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300017549 [Crossref], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]
- Schmitz, L., & Seidl, T. (2022). As open as possible, as autonomous as necessary: Under- standing the rise of open strategic autonomy in EU trade policy. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, jcms.13428. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.13428 [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]
- Schrank, A., & Whitford, J. (2011). The anatomy of network failure. Sociological Theory, 29(3), 151–177. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9558.2011.01392.x [Crossref], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]
- Strange, S. (1996). The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy (Cambridge Studies in International Relations). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511559143 [Crossref], [Google Scholar]
- Tagliapietra, S., & Veugelers, R. (2020). A green industrial policy for Europe. Bruegel. [Google Scholar]
- Thatcher, M. (2007). Internationalisation and economic institutions: Comparing the European experience. Oxford University Press. [Crossref], [Google Scholar]
- Thatcher, M. (2014). From old to new industrial policy via economic regulation. Rivista Della Regolazione Dei Mercati, 2, 6–22. [Google Scholar]
- Thatcher, M., & Vlandas, T. (2016). Overseas state outsiders as new sources of patient capital: Government policies to welcome sovereign wealth fund investment in France and Germany. Socio-Economic Review, 14(4), 647–668. https://doi.org/10.1093/ser/mww028 [Crossref], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]
- Torfing, J., & Sørensen, E. (2014). The European debate on governance networks: Towards a New and viable paradigm? Policy and Society, 33(4), 329–344. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polsoc.2014.10.003 [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]
- van ‘t Klooster, J. (2021). Technocratic keynesianism: A paradigm shift without legislative change. New Political Economy, December, 1–17. https://doi.org/10.1080/13563467.2021.2013791 [Google Scholar]
- von der Leyen, U. (2023). Special address by the president at the world economic forum. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_23_232. [Google Scholar]
- Warwick, K. (2013). Beyond industrial policy: Emerging issues and new trends. OECD Science, Technology and Industry Policy Papers. https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/science-and-technology/beyond-industrial-policy_5k4869clw0xp-en. [Google Scholar]
- Weyand, S. (2022). The double integration doctrine, a conversation with Sabine Weyand. Groupe d’études Géopolitiques. https://geopolitique.eu/en/2022/01/31/the-double-integration-doctrine-sabine-weyand/. [Google Scholar]
- Wigger, A. (2022). The new EU industrial policy and deepening structural asymmetries: Smart specialisation not so smart. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, (61), 20–37. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.13366. [Google Scholar]
- Woll, C., & Jacquot, S. (2010). Using Europe: Strategic action in multi-level politics. Comparative European Politics, 8(1), 110–126. https://doi.org/10.1057/cep.2010.7 [Crossref], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]
- Zeitlin, J., Nicoli, F., & Laffan, B. (2019). Introduction: The European union beyond the polycrisis? Integration and politicization in an Age of shifting cleavages. Journal of European Public Policy, 26(7), 963–976. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2019.1619803 [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]
- https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13501763.2023.2202684
No hay comentarios:
Publicar un comentario