Digital currencies and the soul of money
Speech by Agustín Carstens, General Manager of the BIS, Goethe University's Institute for Law and Finance (ILF) conference on "Data, Digitalization, the New Finance and Central Bank Digital Currencies: The Future of Banking and Money", 18 January 2022
What holds the monetary system together at its core? In a speech at @goetheuni, Agustín Carstens takes inspiration from Germany’s literary giant Goethe to reflect on the soul of money in the digital era.
Las monedas digitales y el alma del dinero
Discurso
de Agustín Carstens, Director General del BIS, en la conferencia del
Instituto de Derecho y Finanzas (ILF) de la Universidad Goethe sobre
"Datos, digitalización, las nuevas finanzas y las monedas digitales de
los bancos centrales: El futuro de la banca y el dinero", 18 de enero de
2022
¿Qué es lo que mantiene unido al sistema monetario en su
núcleo? En una conferencia en @goetheuni, Agustín Carstens se inspira en
el gigante literario alemán Goethe para reflexionar sobre el alma del
dinero en la era digital.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YtC26lYhrQY
https://www.bis.org/speeches/sp220118.htm
Digital currencies and the soul of money
18 Jan 2022 Goethe University Institute of Law and Finance Conference on the Future of the Financial System
What holds the monetary system together at its core? In a speech at @goetheuni, Agustín Carstens takes inspiration from Germany's literary giant Goethe to reflect on the soul of money in the digital era.
I'd like to express my gratitude to the organisers for inviting me here today. It's an honour to deliver this speech at Goethe University. Of course, I wish I could have been in Frankfurt in person.
In a speech at this university four years ago, I addressed the growth and pitfalls of cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin.1 Since then, the debate on the future of money has grown much broader, but it continues to touch on the very foundations of the monetary system.
Today I will take inspiration from your institution's namesake. The great Johann Wolfgang von Goethe was a well-travelled cosmopolitan and a true universalist. He was a poet and novelist, a playwright and theatre director, a scientist and statesman. Remarkably, his work anticipated some key economic issues of our time, including central bank independence.2
Goethe's work confronts fundamental questions. In his masterpiece, Faust, he addresses the "Gretchenfrage" – a term that has become synonymous with a fundamental question of life.
For central bankers, the Gretchenfrage has always been: what is the soul of money? Today, technologists, innovators and futurists are offering new answers to this question. Some say that in the future, money and finance will be provided by just a few big tech corporations. Others dream of a decentralised system in which blockchains and algorithms replace people and institutions. And maybe, all of this will take place in the Metaverse.3
My main message today is simple: the soul of money belongs neither to a big tech nor to an anonymous ledger. The soul of money is trust. So the question becomes: which institution is best placed to generate trust? I will argue that central banks have been and continue to be the institutions best placed to provide trust in the digital age. This is also the best way to ensure an efficient and inclusive financial system to the benefit of all.
Let me elaborate on this theme, starting with the institutional foundations of money.
Me
gustaría expresar mi gratitud a los organizadores por haberme invitado
hoy aquí. Es un honor pronunciar este discurso en la Universidad Goethe.
Por supuesto, me hubiera gustado estar en Frankfurt en persona.
En
un discurso pronunciado en esta universidad hace cuatro años, abordé el
crecimiento y las dificultades de las criptomonedas como el Bitcoin.1
Desde entonces, el debate sobre el futuro del dinero se ha ampliado
mucho, pero sigue afectando a los fundamentos mismos del sistema
monetario.
Hoy me inspiraré en el homónimo de su institución. El
gran Johann Wolfgang von Goethe fue un cosmopolita viajero y un
verdadero universalista. Fue poeta y novelista, dramaturgo y director de
teatro, científico y estadista. Sorprendentemente, su obra se anticipó a
algunas cuestiones económicas clave de nuestro tiempo, como la
independencia de los bancos centrales2.
La obra de Goethe se
enfrenta a cuestiones fundamentales. En su obra maestra, Fausto, aborda
el "Gretchenfrage", un término que se ha convertido en sinónimo de una
cuestión fundamental de la vida.
Para los banqueros centrales, el
Gretchenfrage siempre ha sido: ¿cuál es el alma del dinero? Hoy,
tecnólogos, innovadores y futuristas ofrecen nuevas respuestas a esta
pregunta. Algunos dicen que en el futuro el dinero y las finanzas serán
proporcionados por unas pocas grandes empresas tecnológicas. Otros
sueñan con un sistema descentralizado en el que las cadenas de bloques y
los algoritmos sustituyan a las personas y las instituciones. Y tal
vez, todo esto tenga lugar en el Metaverso.3
Mi mensaje principal
hoy es sencillo: el alma del dinero no pertenece ni a una gran
tecnología ni a un libro de contabilidad anónimo. El alma del dinero es
la confianza. Así que la pregunta es: ¿qué institución está mejor
situada para generar confianza? Voy a argumentar que los bancos
centrales han sido y siguen siendo las instituciones mejor situadas para
proporcionar confianza en la era digital. Esta es también la mejor
manera de garantizar un sistema financiero eficiente e inclusivo en
beneficio de todos.
Permítanme profundizar en este tema, empezando por los fundamentos institucionales del dinero.
The institutional foundations of money
Money is a societal convention. People accept money today with the expectation that everyone else will accept it tomorrow.
At its core, trust in the currency holds the monetary system together. Like the legal system, this trust is a public good.4 Maintaining it is crucial for the effective functioning of societies.
Trust requires sound institutions that can stand the test of time. Institutions that ensure the stability of the currency as the economy's key unit of account, store of value and medium of exchange, and that guarantee the safety and integrity of payments.5
Throughout a history measured not in years but in centuries, independent central banks have emerged as the key institutions that underpins this trust in money. Alternatives have often ended badly.6 It is for good reason that most countries have established central banks with a clear mandate to serve society. As public policy institutions, central banks have proven successful in upholding trust while adapting to societal and economic change.7
In pursuing these mandates, central banks have managed to constantly adapt to technological, economic and societal changes. This is why central banks are actively engaging with digital innovation. They are working on new central bank public goods such as wholesale financial market infrastructures, retail fast payment systems and central bank digital currencies.
Of course, in a market-based system, the private sector remains the main engine of the economy. In today's two-tier monetary system, deposits are by far the most prevalent form of money held by the public, since cash holdings are relatively small. Banks, in turn, place their own deposits with the central bank as "bank reserves".
In this case, central banks provide an open, neutral, trusted and stable platform. Private companies use their ingenuity and dynamism to develop new payment methods and financial products and services,. This combination has been a powerful driver of innovation and welfare.
But we cannot take this successful symbiosis for granted. Some recent developments may threaten money's essence as a public good, if taken too far.
To illustrate this, let me offer three plausible scenarios for the future of money.
- In the first, big tech stablecoins compete with national currencies and against each other too, fragmenting the monetary system.
- The second relates to the elusive promise of crypto and decentralised finance, or "DeFi", which claims to offer a financial system free from powerful intermediaries, but may actually deliver something very different.8
- The third realises the vision of an open and global monetary and financial system that harnesses technology for the benefit of all.
You can probably guess which vision I espouse. I will close by discussing what it will take to achieve it.
El dinero es una convención social. La gente acepta el dinero hoy con la expectativa de que todos los demás lo aceptarán mañana.
En
el fondo, la confianza en la moneda mantiene unido el sistema
monetario. Al igual que el sistema legal, esta confianza es un bien
público.4 Mantenerla es crucial para el funcionamiento eficaz de las
sociedades.
La confianza requiere instituciones sólidas que
puedan resistir el paso del tiempo. Instituciones que garanticen la
estabilidad de la moneda como unidad de cuenta clave de la economía,
depósito de valor y medio de intercambio, y que garanticen la seguridad e
integridad de los pagos5.
A lo largo de una historia que no se
mide en años, sino en siglos, los bancos centrales independientes han
surgido como las instituciones clave que sustentan esta confianza en el
dinero. Las alternativas a menudo han acabado mal.6 Por una buena razón,
la mayoría de los países han establecido bancos centrales con un claro
mandato de servir a la sociedad. Como instituciones de política pública,
los bancos centrales han demostrado tener éxito a la hora de mantener
la confianza y adaptarse a los cambios sociales y económicos7.
En
el cumplimiento de estos mandatos, los bancos centrales han conseguido
adaptarse constantemente a los cambios tecnológicos, económicos y
sociales. Por ello, los bancos centrales están participando activamente
en la innovación digital. Están trabajando en nuevos bienes públicos de
los bancos centrales, como las infraestructuras de los mercados
financieros mayoristas, los sistemas de pagos rápidos al por menor y las
monedas digitales de los bancos centrales.
Por supuesto, en un
sistema basado en el mercado, el sector privado sigue siendo el
principal motor de la economía. En el actual sistema monetario de dos
niveles, los depósitos son, con mucho, la forma de dinero más frecuente
en manos del público, ya que las tenencias de efectivo son relativamente
pequeñas. Los bancos, por su parte, colocan sus propios depósitos en el
banco central como "reservas bancarias".
En este caso, los
bancos centrales proporcionan una plataforma abierta, neutral, de
confianza y estable. Las empresas privadas utilizan su ingenio y
dinamismo para desarrollar nuevos métodos de pago y productos y
servicios financieros. Esta combinación ha sido un poderoso motor de
innovación y bienestar.
Pero no podemos dar por sentada esta
exitosa simbiosis. Algunos acontecimientos recientes pueden amenazar la
esencia del dinero como bien público, si se llevan demasiado lejos.
Para ilustrar esto, permítanme ofrecer tres escenarios plausibles para el futuro del dinero.
En el primero, las stablecoins de las grandes tecnologías compiten con
las monedas nacionales y también entre sí, fragmentando el sistema
monetario.
El segundo se refiere a la esquiva promesa de las
criptomonedas y las finanzas descentralizadas, o "DeFi", que afirma
ofrecer un sistema financiero libre de intermediarios poderosos, pero
que en realidad puede ofrecer algo muy diferente8.
La tercera
hace realidad la visión de un sistema monetario y financiero abierto y
global que aprovecha la tecnología en beneficio de todos.
Probablemente puedan adivinar cuál es mi visión. Terminaré hablando de lo que se necesita para alcanzarla.
Big tech stablecoins
Let's start with stablecoins issued by big techs. Stablecoins are cryptocurrencies that base their value on collateral, often in the form of deposits with commercial banks or other regulated financial instruments. They thus piggyback on the credibility of sovereign currencies. Stablecoins are issued in this first scenario by big techs, or large companies whose primary activity is digital services.
Big techs have made important contributions to financial services. Their new and innovative products have allowed hundreds of millions of new users into the formal financial system.9
In the process, they have also achieved systemic relevance in several major economies. For example, big techs channel 94% of mobile payments in China.10
This trend could accelerate if one of these firms were to grow in an unfettered way and create a dominant, closed ecosystem around its own global stablecoin.11
Once established, a company is likely to erect barriers against new entrants, leading to market dominance, data concentration and reduced competition. In addition, its stablecoin could disintermediate incumbent banks, which could even pose a risk to financial stability.
Moreover, if one big tech stablecoin takes hold, others will seek to imitate it. We may end up with a few dominant walled gardens that compete both with each other and with national currencies, thus fragmenting the national and global monetary systems. As the initial benefits fade, the well-known problems of market concentration will quickly follow.
In addition, the same economic forces that foster inclusion can also cause discrimination, privacy violations and market concentration. One reason is that data are subject to large externalities. For example, one person's data can reveal information about others.12 Moreover, it is possible that the data holder ends up knowing more about users' behaviour than users do themselves.13 Armed with exclusive access to data, big techs can quickly scale up and dominate markets.
Let me be clear: it is undesirable to rely solely on private money. Users may initially find great convenience in paying with a big tech global stablecoin. But in doing so they may be handing the keys to our monetary system over to private entities, driven by profits and accountable only to their shareholders and other insiders. Such an arrangement could erode trust. A public good like money needs oversight with the public interest in mind.
Empecemos
con las stablecoins emitidas por las grandes tecnológicas. Las
stablecoins son criptomonedas que basan su valor en una garantía, a
menudo en forma de depósitos en bancos comerciales u otros instrumentos
financieros regulados. Así, se apoyan en la credibilidad de las monedas
soberanas. En este primer escenario, las grandes empresas tecnológicas, o
grandes compañías cuya actividad principal son los servicios digitales,
emiten las stablecoins.
Las grandes tecnologías han hecho
importantes contribuciones a los servicios financieros. Sus nuevos e
innovadores productos han permitido la entrada de cientos de millones de
nuevos usuarios en el sistema financiero formal9.
En el proceso,
también han alcanzado relevancia sistémica en varias economías
importantes. Por ejemplo, las grandes tecnológicas canalizan el 94% de
los pagos por móvil en China10.
Esta tendencia podría acelerarse
si una de estas empresas creciera de forma desmedida y creara un
ecosistema dominante y cerrado en torno a su propia stablecoin global11.
Una
vez establecida, es probable que una empresa erija barreras contra los
nuevos participantes, lo que llevaría al dominio del mercado, la
concentración de datos y la reducción de la competencia. Además, su
stablecoin podría desintermediar a los bancos tradicionales, lo que
podría incluso suponer un riesgo para la estabilidad financiera.
Además,
si una gran tecnología stablecoin se impone, otras tratarán de
imitarla. Podemos acabar con unos cuantos jardines amurallados
dominantes que compitan entre sí y con las monedas nacionales,
fragmentando así los sistemas monetarios nacionales y mundiales. A
medida que los beneficios iniciales se desvanezcan, los conocidos
problemas de concentración del mercado no tardarán en aparecer.
Además,
las mismas fuerzas económicas que fomentan la inclusión también pueden
causar discriminación, violaciones de la privacidad y concentración del
mercado. Una de las razones es que los datos están sujetos a grandes
externalidades. Por ejemplo, los datos de una persona pueden revelar
información sobre otras.12 Además, es posible que el titular de los
datos acabe sabiendo más sobre el comportamiento de los usuarios que los
propios usuarios.13 Armadas con un acceso exclusivo a los datos, las
grandes tecnologías pueden escalar rápidamente y dominar los mercados.
Que
quede claro: no es deseable depender únicamente del dinero privado. Los
usuarios pueden encontrar inicialmente una gran comodidad en el pago
con una stablecoin global de una gran tecnología. Pero al hacerlo pueden
estar entregando las claves de nuestro sistema monetario a entidades
privadas, movidas por los beneficios y que sólo rinden cuentas a sus
accionistas y otras personas con información privilegiada. Un acuerdo de
este tipo podría erosionar la confianza. Un bien público como el dinero
necesita una supervisión que tenga en cuenta el interés público.
The elusive promise of decentralisation
A second plausible scenario for the future of money has attracted a growing number of enthusiasts. This vision replaces institutions with distributed ledger technology (DLT), in principle allowing anyone to be a validator in a shared network. It is embodied in the growth of cryptocurrencies and applications that build on them, such as so-called decentralised finance, or "DeFi".14
DeFi's enthusiasts hold out some very appealing promises: DLT will "democratise finance", cutting out middlemen such as big banks. More generally, new decentralised protocols will lay the groundwork for "Web 3.0", or simply "web3". In this world, data will be reclaimed from the big techs, and entrepreneurs and artists will keep a greater share of the value they create.15
Decentralisation can be a noble goal. In many applications, governance improves when power is genuinely dispersed, with appropriate checks and balances. This principle is embodied in free and competitive markets.
But this principle is not what DeFi applications are delivering. There is a large gulf between vision and reality.
To date, the DeFi space has been used primarily for speculative activities. Users invest, borrow and trade cryptoassets in a largely unregulated environment. The absence of controls such as know-your-customer (KYC) and anti-money laundering rules, might well be one important factor in DeFi's growth.
Indeed, a parallel financial system is emerging, revolving around two elements.
The first is automated, self-executing protocols, or "smart contracts". But these contracts will never be smart enough to cover every possible eventuality, and someone must therefore write and update the code, and run the platform. In practice, there is a lot of centralisation in DeFi. BIS economists have discussed this "decentralisation illusion" in recent research.16
The second element is, again, stablecoins. These grease the wheels of DeFi. As they aim to maintain a fixed value to fiat currencies, they allow transfers across platforms, and form a bridge to the traditional financial system. Stablecoins are the settlement instrument in DeFi, alongside governance tokens and other more volatile cryptoassets.17
But stablecoins may not be sound money. One drawback is the fact that they have to tie their value to regulated assets to borrow their credibility. Their issuers have an inherent incentive to invest reserve assets in a risky manner to earn a return. Without appropriate regulation, issuers can diverge from full backing, or test the margins of what counts as a safe asset – as experience has repeatedly shown.18
More fundamentally, decentralisation comes at a cost. Trust in an anonymous system is maintained by self-interested validators who ensure the integrity of the ledger in the absence of a central authority.19 So the system must generate enough fees, or rents, to provide these validators with the right incentive.
These rents accumulate mostly to insiders, such as Bitcoin miners, or those who hold more governance tokens.20 These rents are also a reason why DeFi platforms have been so attractive for venture capital investment.21 Many protocols entrench insiders, as those with more coins have more power.
Ultimately, high rents for insiders mean high costs for users. So, while insiders who have sold coins to new users have made spectacular returns, efficiency gains for average users have so far failed to materialise. And in the absence of regulation, fraud, hacks and so-called rug pulls have become rampant.22
In addition, this structure makes it hard for fully decentralised systems to scale up. Achieving agreement in a large network takes time and effort, and consumes energy. The larger the ledger, the harder it becomes to update it quickly.
This is why many DLT systems can only handle a small volume of transactions to date, and often suffer from network congestion. This is also the reason why Bitcoin requires so much electricity. There are a variety of technical proposals to address this trade-off, but they all lead to greater complexity. Indeed, the need for rents to maintain incentives in a blockchain is a feature, not a bug; it is a case of "the more the sorrier" instead of "the more the merrier".
And the growing proliferation of different blockchains means that many competing candidates aim to be a single arbiter of truth.
Meanwhile, DeFi is subject to the same vulnerabilities as are present in traditional financial services. High leverage, liquidity mismatches and connections to the formal financial system mean vulnerabilities in DeFi could undermine the stability of the broader financial system.23 As with money market mutual funds, there is a risk that, during a shock, stablecoins could face runs. With automated protocols, there may also be unpredictable interactions, as liquidity dries up and losses cascade through the system.
Thus, there is a risk that this "magic", once launched, may spin out of control. As in Goethe's Zauberlehrling ("The Sorcerer's Apprentice"), DeFi applications could take on a life of their own, interacting with one another in unpredictable ways. When a crash happens and money is lost, users will inevitably turn to a trusted and experienced party – the public authorities – to tame the unleashed spirits and restore order.
A better approach is possible. Building on sound money, new applications could stand on a stronger footing. They should not be based on anonymity but on identification and trust. And they should comply with financial regulation that is designed to keep the system safe. Wherever private stablecoins are issued, they need to be adequately regulated to address the risks that they pose, such as runs, payment system risk and concentration of economic power.24 We also need effective and consistent international policy on stablecoin arrangements.25
Innovators should not fear regulators but work with them, to make their products more sound and more sustainable.
An open and global system as a public good
In a third scenario, incumbent financial institutions, big techs and new innovative entrants compete in an open marketplace that guarantees interoperability, building on central bank public goods. This means that end users can seamlessly interact across different providers – both domestically and across borders.26
This would bring about continued innovation, and ever better outcomes for the economy as a whole.27 Trust in money remains the bedrock of stability. End users would see low costs and convenient services, with safety, privacy and a broad range of payment choices. This scenario harnesses the benefits of big data and DLT with market structures that foster competition and promote the public good nature of the monetary system.
In this vision, the monetary system is not fragmented into separate walled gardens, nor is it dominated by a few large corporations. There are also no high rents for insiders in anonymous networks.
At the core of this system are central banks. They do not aim for profits, but to serve society. They have no commercial interest in personal data. They act as operators, overseers and catalysts in payments markets, and regulate and supervise private providers in the public interest. Working together, they can provide central bank digital currencies (CBDCs). Unlike stablecoins, CBDCs do not need to borrow their credibility. As they are directly issued by the central bank, they inherit the trust that the public already places in their currency. They can thus serve as a sound foundation for future innovation.
Central banks can provide this foundation domestically, but also on a global scale.
Imagine a global network of CBDCs. Different central banks would design and issue a new form of public money, tailored to their economies and societies' preferences.
Importantly, central banks could work with one another, and with the private sector, to ensure that these domestic CBDCs are interoperable across borders. This would require technical compatibility, the ability for systems to "speak each other's language" and agreement on rights and obligations.28 To obtain this, central banks could choose whether to build a network of bilateral links, or they could adopt a hub-and-spoke model or a single common platform. DLT could be used to connect multiple CBDCs issued by different central banks. This would be useful as no single central bank could straddle all the different currencies in the system.
Such a network would be a global version of domestic monetary systems grounded in the trust placed in central banks. It could lower the cost of cross-border payments; increase their speed and transparency; and broaden access to users in different countries. Private providers could interact with clients, conducting know-your-customer and other compliance checks. The private sector could build a host of financial services on top of such a system, from innovative payments to lending, to insurance and investment services. But safeguards can give users control over personal data. This does not require the selling of speculative coins that serve only to enrich insiders.
The BIS Innovation Hub is working actively to make this vision a reality, with several experiments involving cooperation between central banks and the private sector. What is notable is that many of these projects are based on DLT, where the central banks play the key role. Based on trust instead of rents, these systems overcome the inherent issues with scaling up. They also offer greater safety and efficiency. Three important BIS Innovation Hub projects all make use of a DLT platform upon which multiple central banks issue their own wholesale CBDCs so that they can be traded between participants to enable faster, cheaper and safer cross-border settlements.
- In Project Jura, each central bank maintains individual control over its own CBDC on a single platform with separate subnetworks.29
- In project mBridge, each participating central bank issues its own CBDCs and operates a validating node in a shared system.30
- Project Dunbar explores the advantages and disadvantages of different DLT prototypes and validating mechanisms to support a common multi-CBDC platform.31
Overall, these projects show that there is significant potential in new technologies, including DLT, if they are applied in a way that builds on the monetary system's existing institutional framework. Central banks, as validating nodes, are not there to make money by mining coins. Instead, they perform this role as part of their public service mandate.
Working in a controlled environment and with industry partners, the BIS and host central banks are developing public goods that can be thoroughly tested and ready to be rolled out in the real world.
En un tercer escenario, las instituciones financieras tradicionales, las grandes tecnologías y los nuevos participantes innovadores compiten en un mercado abierto que garantiza la interoperabilidad, basándose en los bienes públicos de los bancos centrales. Esto significa que los usuarios finales pueden interactuar sin problemas con diferentes proveedores, tanto a nivel nacional como transfronterizo26.
Ello permitiría una innovación continua y unos resultados cada vez mejores para el conjunto de la economía27 . La confianza en el dinero sigue siendo la base de la estabilidad. Los usuarios finales verían unos costes bajos y unos servicios cómodos, con seguridad, privacidad y una amplia gama de opciones de pago. Este escenario aprovecha las ventajas de los big data y la DLT con estructuras de mercado que fomentan la competencia y promueven la naturaleza de bien público del sistema monetario.
En esta visión, el sistema monetario no está fragmentado en jardines amurallados separados, ni está dominado por unas pocas grandes empresas. Tampoco hay grandes rentas para los iniciados en las redes anónimas.
En el centro de este sistema están los bancos centrales. Su objetivo no es obtener beneficios, sino servir a la sociedad. No tienen ningún interés comercial en los datos personales. Actúan como operadores, supervisores y catalizadores en los mercados de pagos, y regulan y supervisan a los proveedores privados en aras del interés público. Trabajando juntos, pueden proporcionar monedas digitales de banco central (CBDC). A diferencia de las stablecoins, las CBDC no necesitan pedir prestada su credibilidad. Al ser emitidas directamente por el banco central, heredan la confianza que el público ya deposita en su moneda. Por tanto, pueden servir de base sólida para futuras innovaciones.
Los bancos centrales pueden proporcionar esta base a nivel nacional, pero también a escala mundial.
Imaginemos una red mundial de CBDC. Los distintos bancos centrales diseñarían y emitirían una nueva forma de dinero público, adaptada a las preferencias de sus economías y sociedades.
Y lo que es más importante, los bancos centrales podrían colaborar entre sí, y con el sector privado, para garantizar que estas CBDC nacionales sean interoperables a través de las fronteras. Esto requeriría compatibilidad técnica, la capacidad de los sistemas de "hablar el idioma del otro" y un acuerdo sobre derechos y obligaciones28 . Para conseguirlo, los bancos centrales podrían elegir entre construir una red de enlaces bilaterales, o adoptar un modelo hub-and-spoke o una única plataforma común. La DLT podría utilizarse para conectar múltiples CBDC emitidas por diferentes bancos centrales. Esto sería útil, ya que ningún banco central podría abarcar todas las monedas del sistema.
Esta red sería una versión global de los sistemas monetarios nacionales basada en la confianza depositada en los bancos centrales. Podría reducir el coste de los pagos transfronterizos, aumentar su velocidad y transparencia y ampliar el acceso a los usuarios de los distintos países. Los proveedores privados podrían interactuar con los clientes, realizando controles de conocimiento del cliente y otros controles de cumplimiento. El sector privado podría crear una gran cantidad de servicios financieros sobre este sistema, desde pagos innovadores hasta préstamos, seguros y servicios de inversión. Pero las salvaguardias pueden dar a los usuarios el control sobre los datos personales. Esto no requiere la venta de monedas especulativas que sólo sirven para enriquecer a los iniciados.
El Centro de Innovación del BPI está trabajando activamente para hacer realidad esta visión, con varios experimentos de cooperación entre los bancos centrales y el sector privado. Lo notable es que muchos de estos proyectos se basan en DLT, donde los bancos centrales desempeñan el papel principal. Basados en la confianza en lugar de las rentas, estos sistemas superan los problemas inherentes a la ampliación. También ofrecen mayor seguridad y eficiencia. Tres importantes proyectos del Centro de Innovación del BPI utilizan una plataforma DLT en la que varios bancos centrales emiten sus propios CBDC al por mayor para que puedan negociarse entre los participantes y permitir liquidaciones transfronterizas más rápidas, baratas y seguras.
Conclusion
Let me conclude. The future of money is ours to shape. While central banks share the excitement around digital innovation, we are aware of the potential consequences of some of its incarnations.
The design of money has consequences that concern all of society: the integrity and stability of money and payments, market concentration, consumer rights and efficiency. Hence, central bankers must work with other public authorities and private stakeholders to make the vision I have described a reality.
Let's innovate in a sound, sustainable way, harnessing the benefits of digital technology in a way that is consistent with our shared values. In particular, let's ensure that our financial system builds on the existing governance of money, serves the public interest, and works cooperatively with the private sector.
So, let me go back to where I started, to Goethe. The answer to the Gretchenfrage has not changed: central banks and public authorities are still the glue that holds the monetary and financial system together. Private sector services and innovation are essential and should thrive on this foundation. But trust can never be outsourced nor automated.
Permítanme
concluir. El futuro del dinero es nuestro. Aunque los bancos centrales
comparten el entusiasmo por la innovación digital, somos conscientes de
las posibles consecuencias de algunas de sus encarnaciones.
El
diseño del dinero tiene consecuencias que afectan a toda la sociedad: la
integridad y la estabilidad del dinero y los pagos, la concentración
del mercado, los derechos de los consumidores y la eficiencia. De ahí
que los banqueros centrales deban colaborar con otras autoridades
públicas y con los agentes privados para hacer realidad la visión que he
descrito.
Innovemos de forma sólida y sostenible, aprovechando
las ventajas de la tecnología digital de forma coherente con nuestros
valores compartidos. En particular, asegurémonos de que nuestro sistema
financiero se basa en la actual gobernanza del dinero, sirve al interés
público y trabaja en cooperación con el sector privado.
Así pues,
permítanme volver al punto de partida, a Goethe. La respuesta al
Gretchenfrage no ha cambiado: los bancos centrales y las autoridades
públicas siguen siendo el pegamento que mantiene unido el sistema
monetario y financiero. Los servicios y la innovación del sector privado
son esenciales y deben prosperar sobre esta base. Pero la confianza
nunca puede externalizarse ni automatizarse.
Herzlichen Dank für Ihre Aufmerksamkeit!
1 See A Carstens, "Money in the digital age: what role for central banks?", speech, House of Finance, Goethe University, Frankfurt, 6 February 2018.
2 See J Weidmann, "Money creation and responsibility", speech, 18 September 2012; H Binswanger, C Binswanger and J Harrison, Money and Magic: a Critique of the Modern Economy in the Light of Goethe's Faust, University Of Chicago Press, 1994.
3 See P Clark, "The Metaverse Has Already Arrived. Here's What That Actually Means", Time, 15 November 2021. The concept of the metaverse is often traced back to N Stephenson, Snow Crash, New York: Bantam Books, 1992. This fictional metaverse was conceived of as a 100-metre-wide street around a spherical planet that users could access with virtual reality goggles or from booths, and in which users would be represented as "avatars".
4 A Carstens, "The future of money and the payment system: what role for central banks?", lecture at Princeton University, 5 December 2019.
5 BIS, "Central banks and payments in the digital era", Annual Economic Report, Chapter III, June 2020; C Borio, "On money, debt, trust and central banking", BIS Working Papers, no 763, January 2019.
6 See J Frost, H S Shin and P Wierts, "An early stablecoin? The Bank of Amsterdam and the governance of money", BIS Working Papers, no 902, November 2020.
7 C Giannini, The age of central banks, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011.
8 DeFi refers to financial applications built on permissionless distributed ledger technology (DLT). See below.
9 See K Croxson, J Frost, L Gambacorta and T Valletti, "Platform-based business models and financial inclusion", BIS Working Papers, 10 January 2022.
10 In India, big techs provide third-party services in the Unified Payment Interface (UPI), accounting for 90% of transactions on UPI, but the funds remain with banks. See D D'Silva, Z Filkova, F Packer and S Tiwari, "The design of digital financial infrastructure: lessons from India", BIS Papers, no 106, 15 December 2019.
11 There is an important distinction between big techs offering payment services with other firms' stablecoins, and issuing their own stablecoins. In the United States and Guatemala, Meta's subsidiary Novi is currently piloting a wallet product using the Paxos stablecoin. The issuance of the Diem stablecoin is on hold. See Novi, "Pilot Version of Novi Now Available", press release, 19 October 2021.
12 See D Bergemann, A Bonatti and T Gan, "The Economics of Social Data", Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, no 2203R, September 2019.
13 M Brunnermeier, R Lamba and C Segura-Rodriguez, "Inverse Selection", working paper, 2020.
14 See S Aramonte, W Huang and A Schrimpf, "DeFi risks and the decentralisation illusion", BIS Quarterly Review, December 2021; F Schär, "Decentralized Finance: On Blockchain- and Smart Contract-Based Financial Markets", Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis Review, vol 103, no 2, 2021; N Carter and L Jeng, "DeFi Protocol Risks: The Paradox of DeFi" in B Coen and D Maurice (eds), Regtech, Suptech and Beyond: Innovation and Technology in Financial Services, Risk Books, 2021.
15 See B Allen, "People are talking about Web3. Is it the Internet of the future or just a buzzword?", NPR, 21 November 2021. For critical takes, see J Geuter, "The Third Web", 17 December 2021; M Elgan, "You can safely ignore Web3", Computer World, 28 December 2021.
16 Aramonte et al (2021).
17 Governance tokens are a cryptoasset that grants voting power to its holder for decisions in the shared system
18 D Arner, R Auer and J Frost, "Stablecoins: risks, potential and regulation", Bank of Spain, Financial Stability Review, no 39, Autumn. There are also decentralised stablecoin designs that eliminate the need to trust an intermediary, but these generally must be highly overcollateralised, limiting their usefulness for mainstream applications. See C Catalini and A de Gortari, "On the Economic Design of Stablecoins", mimeo, 5 August 2021.
19 R Auer, C Monnet and H S Shin, "Distributed ledgers and the governance of money", BIS Working Papers, no 924, November 2021.
20 In some automated trading platforms, there is the potential for large validators to front-run other users and "win" the next block in the ledger. This is sometimes referred to as "miner extractable value".
21 See G Cornelli, S Doerr, L Franco and J Frost, "Funding for fintechs", BIS Quarterly Review, September 2021. Investment in crypto and DLT firms has boomed in 2021, in line with strong interest in DeFi applications.
22 A rug pull refers to the development team of a cryptocurrency or Defi project abandoning their project and absconding with the investors' funds. According to Chainanalysis, investors around the globe were defrauded by over USD 2.8 billion in 2021 alone. See www.afr.com/companies/financial-services/the-rug-pull-crypto-investors-lose-4b-in-a-new-scam-20220111-p59nan.
23 Aramonte et al (2021).
24 See US President's Working Group on Financial Markets, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Report on stablecoins, November 2021.
25 In this light, the BIS Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI) and the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) have proposed guidance on the application of their standards, the Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures, to stablecoin arrangements. See CPMI and IOSCO, "Application of the Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures to stablecoin arrangements", 6 October 2021.
26 See C Boar, S Claessens, A Kosse, R Leckow and T Rice, "Interoperability between payment systems across borders", BIS Bulletin, no 49, 10 December 2021.
27 On the ability of ("neck-and-neck") competition between firms to drive innovation, see P Aghion, N Bloom, R Blundell, R Griffith and P Howitt, "Competition and innovation: An inverted-U relationship", Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol 120, no 2, 2005, pp 701–28.
28 Boar et al (2021).
29 Banque de France, BIS and Swiss National Bank, "Project Jura: Cross-border settlement using wholesale CBDC", 8 December 2021.
30 BIS Innovation Hub Hong Kong Centre, Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Bank of Thailand, Digital Currency Institute of the People's Bank of China and Central Bank of the United Arab Emirates, "Inthanon-LionRock to mBridge: Building a multi CBDC platform for international payments", 28 September 2021.
31 BIS, "BIS Innovation Hub and central banks of Australia, Malaysia, Singapore and South Africa will test CBDCs for international settlements", press release, 2 September 2021. The project involves the Reserve Bank of Australia, Central Bank of Malaysia, Monetary Authority of Singapore and South African Reserve Bank.
https://www.bis.org/author/agust%c3%adn_carstens.htm
Agustín Carstens - General Manager
Agustín Carstens became General Manager of the BIS on 1 December 2017.
Mr Carstens was Governor of the Bank of Mexico from 2010 to 2017. A member of the BIS Board from 2011 to 2017, he was chair of the Global Economy Meeting and the Economic Consultative Committee from 2013 until 2017. He also chaired the International Monetary and Financial Committee, the IMF's policy advisory committee from 2015 to 2017.
Mr Carstens began his career in 1980 at the Bank of Mexico. From 1999 to 2000, he was Executive Director at the IMF. He later served as Mexico's deputy finance minister (2000-03) and as Deputy Managing Director at the IMF (2003-06). He was Mexico's finance minister from 2006 to 2009.
En la actualidad hay 10.500 monedas, sin regular, y hay personas que no se ponen las manos en la cabeza
El BIS habla de la competencia entre dinero público y privado. “En un mundo de monedas digitales, los formuladores de políticas se enfrentarán a desafíos conceptuales. El dinero ya no será tan simple como en el pasado: cada moneda digital incluirá una variedad de servicios de datos, y tendrá una serie de actividades económicas transfronterizas”.
CBDC El Banco Central de China prueba su divisa digital.
Riesgos
https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-56732881
https://www.blockchaineconomia.es/bis-alerta-de-la-creacion-de-areas-monetarias-de-criptomonedas/
La mala economia de las criptomonedas
Daniel García 10-09-2018
https://nadaesgratis.es/daniel-garcia/la-mala-economia-de-las-criptomonedas
https://fortune.com/2018/05/29/bitcoin-gold-hack/
https://scholar.princeton.edu/markus/publications/blockchain-economics
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https://www.sas.upenn.edu/~jesusfv/currency_competition.pdf
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-08-09/bitcoin-s-big-problems
Bitcoin Spinoff Hacked in Rare ‘51% Attack’ By Jeff John Roberts -May 29, 2018
https://fortune.com/2018/05/29/bitcoin-gold-hack/
I-Mis aventuras con Bitcoin : El dinero es memoria JFV
II Funcionamiento del bitcoin
III-Historia y evaluacion JFV
Desafios
Gasto energético
"El gasto energético es claramente importante desde el punto de vista ético. Entiendo que hay estudios concretos que lo miden. También hay investigaciones que buscan alternativas al minado con menor huella energética". José Penalva Zuasti
https://nadaesgratis.es/admin/esta-bien-invertir-en-bitcoin
Riesgos
Preocupaciones sistémicas
El ETF del bitcoin intensifica los riesgos para los inversores y puede ser una amenaza para otros mercados, según el BiS
Posibles daños colaterales
Xavier Puig es Doctor en Administración y Dirección de Empresas por la Universitat Pompeu Fabra y Director de los programas “In-company” de Banca y Finanzas de la BSM- Universidad Pompeu Fabra. En la actualidad es socio y consejero de Gesiuris Asset Management SGIIC S.A y vicepresidente de CAT Patrimonis SIMCAV S.A, Sociedad de Inversión que cotiza en el MAB.
https://patrimonia.bsm.upf.edu/el-tercer-error-de-los-inversores-no-tomar-distancia-con-el-dinero/
Xavier Puig habla, dentro del ámbito de las finanzas conductuales o behavioral finance, sobre cómo los individuos experimentan las pérdidas más intensamente que las ganancias.
RENTA VARIABLE – CAPÃ?TULO 3: QUÃ? ES Y QUÃ? NO ES
LA BOLSA
Uploaded by Xavier Puig – idEC (Universitat Pompeu
Fabra)
En una situación de crecimiento cero, el profesor de la Universidad Pompeu Fabra, Xavier Puig, habla de qué hacer con nuestros ahorros. ¿Invertir en renta fija o en renta variable? 2014
Fintechs y creación de nuevos productos y procesos financieros
Blockchain y servicios financieros
· https://patrimonia.bsm.upf.edu/blockchain-servicios-financieros-fintech/
Desafios
Tributación de las criptomonedas
Articulos anteriores Relacionados
Evolución del dinero
https://brujulaeconomica.blogspot.com/2016/04/la-evolucion-del-dinero-teorias-del.html
https://brujulaeconomica.blogspot.com/2014/03/creacion-del-dinero-bcentralinglaterra.html
https://brujulaeconomica.blogspot.com/2016/09/eliminemos-el-dinero-en-metalico-jesus.html
https://brujulaeconomica.blogspot.com/2016/04/competencia-entre-dineros-privados.html
https://brujulaeconomica.blogspot.com/2020/04/banca-privada-banca-publica-bancos.html
https://brujulaeconomica.blogspot.com/2011/11/n-369-ii-derivados-hedge-funds-over.html
https://brujulaeconomica.blogspot.com/2010/05/c-d-s-innovacion-financiera-seguro.html
https://brujulaeconomica.blogspot.com/2008/09/crash-o-batacazos.html
Glosario
https://articulosclaves.blogspot.com/2021/10/crypto-glossary.html
Avisos B de E
https://articulosclaves.blogspot.com/2021/12/las-criptomonedas-o-monedas-virtuales.html
Intel se prepara para entrar fuerte al mundo de la minería de Bitcoin con "Bonanza Mine", un ASIC de alta eficiencia
https://www.xataka.com/criptomonedas/intel-se-prepara-para-entrar-fuerte-al-mundo-mineria-bitcoin-bonanza-mine-asic-alta-eficiencia?utm_content=bufferc3697&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook.com&utm_campaign=buffer&fbclid=IwAR2VIXD-MlqQ9RXqJ8Md5kXy1lXLqmbyp_ybqh-GwoEvBsevEpkRLwPPKz0
· https://brujulaeconomica.blogspot.com/2019/08/historia-de-los-productos-financieros.html
https://articulosclaves.blogspot.com/2021/09/criptomonedas-si-pero-cuando-esten.html
Digital currencies and the soul of money
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YtC26lYhrQY
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