1.Informe
Trimestral del BPI de marzo de 2018: Vuelve la
volatilidad
2. ¿Cómo y cuándo se producirá la próxima crisis financiera? - 26
expertos opinan
2.1 The next financial crisis
3.Escenario coyote 2020
1.Informe
Trimestral del BPI de marzo de 2018: Vuelve la volatilidad
Declaraciones on-the-record de
Claudio Borio, Jefe del Departamento Monetario y Económico, y Hyun Song
Shin, Asesor Económico y Jefe de Estudios, del Banco de Pagos
Internacionales, 9 de marzo de 2018.
Vuelve la volatilidad
BIS Quarterly Review |
11 marzo 2018
|
18 pages
-
Los mercados
bursátiles de todo el mundo experimentaron una acusada corrección a finales de
enero y principios de febrero. Tras un persistente repunte que duró varios
meses y que se cerró con el mejor mes de enero desde la década de 1990, la
publicación de un informe sobre el mercado laboral que mostraba un crecimiento
salarial superior al previsto en Estados Unidos marcó el inicio de una
repentina intensificación de la actividad. Las cotizaciones bursátiles cayeron,
rebotaron y volvieron a retroceder, en un contexto de niveles inusuales de
volatilidad intradía. Esta corrección coincidió con un alza de la volatilidad
en los mercados de deuda pública. Los rendimientos de los títulos del Tesoro a
largo plazo llevaban aumentando paulatinamente desde mediados de diciembre, ya
que los inversores parecían cada vez más preocupados por los riesgos de
inflación y por los efectos macroeconómicos de la reforma fiscal
estadounidense. Una súbita aceleración de los rendimientos en los últimos días
de enero precedió a una caída de los mercados bursátiles en Estados Unidos y,
con posterioridad, en otras economías avanzadas (EA). Los rendimientos de la
deuda pública también subieron en otras EA, puesto que el repunte sincronizado
del crecimiento mundial llevó a los inversores a descontar una retirada de las
políticas no convencionales menos gradual de lo que se esperaba hasta entonces.
Durante todo
el periodo analizado, que comenzó a finales de noviembre, los participantes en
los mercados continuaron siendo muy sensibles a cualquier cambio percibido en
los mensajes de los bancos centrales. Como se esperaba, la Reserva Federal
elevó en diciembre el intervalo objetivo para la tasa de los fondos federales
en 25 puntos básicos y continuó avanzando, en general según lo previsto, en la
reducción de su balance. Al otro lado del Atlántico, el BCE mantuvo inalteradas
la orientación de su política monetaria y su orientación de expectativas («forward
guidance»), y continuó sin fijar una fecha concreta para la conclusión de
su programa de compra de activos (APP). El Banco de Japón respondió a un
repunte de los rendimientos a largo plazo, que parecía poner en entredicho su
política de control de la curva de rendimientos, con una oferta para comprar
una cantidad ilimitada de deuda pública a largo plazo.
Las
convulsiones de los mercados se produjeron en un contexto general de debilidad
sostenida del dólar estadounidense durante buena parte del periodo, continua
relajación de las condiciones crediticias y una intrépida toma de riesgos en la
mayoría de las clases de activos. Un breve repliegue hacia activos más seguros
asociado con el clímax de las turbulencias bursátiles proporcionó al dólar un
apoyo bastante limitado. Ni el continuo proceso de endurecimiento de la
política monetaria de la Reserva Federal ni las recientes ventas masivas de
renta variable coincidieron con una ampliación de los diferenciales de
rendimiento de la deuda corporativa, que permanecieron en sus mínimos
históricos. El apetito por activos de economías de mercado emergentes (EME)
también continuó siendo fuerte. Los mercados bursátiles no tardaron en
estabilizarse y reducir sus pérdidas. Al mismo tiempo, parecía que los
inversores en renta fija tenían dificultades para valorar el impacto total de
los cambios de las previsiones de inflación y el incierto volumen de la futura
oferta neta de valores con vencimientos más largos.
- https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1803a_es.htm
Los
prestamistas comunes en Asia emergente: distintos papeles en tres crisis
BIS Quarterly Review |
11 marzo 2018
| 13 pages
-
-
En varias de
las crisis financieras recientes se ha observado la presencia de un canal
del prestamista común. Con este término se alude a la tendencia de las condiciones
de crisis a propagarse de unos países a otros al retirarse los bancos
acreedores de países que hasta entonces no se habían visto afectados por la
crisis, como consecuencia de sus problemas en otros que sí la padecen.
El canal del prestamista común tuvo especial relevancia en la crisis financiera asiática (CFA) de 1997-98, cuando una serie de países se vieron aquejados por graves tensiones financieras con consecuencias reales significativas. En el presente artículo analizamos las fluctuaciones del crédito bancario internacional en Asia emergente en la época de la CFA, así como en torno a la Gran Crisis Financiera (GCF) de 2007-09 y la crisis de la deuda soberana europea de 2010-12. La composición de bancos acreedores en la región ha experimentado cambios notables en el curso de los últimos 20 años (McGuire y van Rixtel (2012)). Por lo tanto, estos episodios presentan tres patrones distintos de exposición de países prestamistas frente a países en crisis, así como tres ejemplos de los efectos que el canal del prestamista común puede tener en el crédito a las economías de mercado emergentes (EME).
Tras explicar sucintamente los conceptos subyacentes al canal del prestamista común, analizamos la forma en la que este canal se manifestó en Asia emergente durante los tres episodios de crisis citados. La CFA constituye un caso extremo, con perturbaciones tanto de la demanda como de la oferta de crédito. La GCF presenta un cuadro variado. La demanda de crédito en el seno de Asia prácticamente no cambió, mientras que en el caso de la oferta los efectos difirieron entre bancos acreedores. Las repercusiones de la crisis de la deuda soberana europea para la demanda en Asia también fueron moderadas, pero sus efectos sobre la oferta presentan también en este caso una imagen más matizada. Por último, examinamos la composición actual de prestamistas de la región, incluida la creciente presencia global de los bancos chinos.
El canal del prestamista común tuvo especial relevancia en la crisis financiera asiática (CFA) de 1997-98, cuando una serie de países se vieron aquejados por graves tensiones financieras con consecuencias reales significativas. En el presente artículo analizamos las fluctuaciones del crédito bancario internacional en Asia emergente en la época de la CFA, así como en torno a la Gran Crisis Financiera (GCF) de 2007-09 y la crisis de la deuda soberana europea de 2010-12. La composición de bancos acreedores en la región ha experimentado cambios notables en el curso de los últimos 20 años (McGuire y van Rixtel (2012)). Por lo tanto, estos episodios presentan tres patrones distintos de exposición de países prestamistas frente a países en crisis, así como tres ejemplos de los efectos que el canal del prestamista común puede tener en el crédito a las economías de mercado emergentes (EME).
Tras explicar sucintamente los conceptos subyacentes al canal del prestamista común, analizamos la forma en la que este canal se manifestó en Asia emergente durante los tres episodios de crisis citados. La CFA constituye un caso extremo, con perturbaciones tanto de la demanda como de la oferta de crédito. La GCF presenta un cuadro variado. La demanda de crédito en el seno de Asia prácticamente no cambió, mientras que en el caso de la oferta los efectos difirieron entre bancos acreedores. Las repercusiones de la crisis de la deuda soberana europea para la demanda en Asia también fueron moderadas, pero sus efectos sobre la oferta presentan también en este caso una imagen más matizada. Por último, examinamos la composición actual de prestamistas de la región, incluida la creciente presencia global de los bancos chinos.
About the
authors
- https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1803b_es.htm
Indicadores
de alerta temprana de crisis bancarias: ampliación de la familia
El
endeudamiento de los hogares y la deuda internacional (transfronteriza o en
moneda extranjera) son una posible fuente de vulnerabilidades que podrían
acabar causando crisis bancarias. Los autores del presente artículo monográfico
analizan formalmente esta cuestión evaluando la capacidad de estas categorías
de deuda para actuar como indicadores de alerta temprana de crisis bancarias
sistémicas. La conclusión es que efectivamente ofrecen información de utilidad.
De hecho, en la submuestra más reciente, la información proporcionada por los
indicadores de deuda transfronteriza y de los hogares es similar a la de las
tradicionales variables de crédito agregado que el BPI sigue periódicamente.
Confirmando los resultados de trabajos anteriores, la combinación de estos
indicadores con los precios inmobiliarios mejora sus resultados. Un análisis de
las actuales condiciones globales basado en este conjunto de datos enriquecido
señala la acumulación de vulnerabilidades en varios países.
- https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1803e.htm
Hipotecas,
promotores y precios inmobiliarios
El presente
artículo monográfico estudia los riesgos que plantea el rápido incremento de la
deuda de los promotores inmobiliarios que ha tenido lugar durante los últimos
años en varias economías asiáticas. Las empresas del sector se alejan
progresivamente de los préstamos bancarios tradicionales para recurrir, en
cambio, a la emisión de títulos de deuda, a menudo en monedas extranjeras.
Hasta la fecha, el endeudamiento se ha mantenido en niveles bajos en la mayoría
de las empresas, pero su exigua rentabilidad y el descenso de sus coeficientes
de cobertura de intereses son motivo de preocupación. Por lo tanto, las
empresas son vulnerables a perturbaciones como subidas de las tasas de interés,
caídas de los precios inmobiliarios o depreciaciones de la moneda local.
Incluso si se logran evitar los impagos, el deterioro de los fundamentales en
el sector podría contagiarse a otras partes de la economía por medio de un
descenso de los precios de la vivienda.
--
Articulos
anteriores:
-
No hemos
aprendido nada
10 Años
despues de L.B
Informe Trimestral del BPI, junio de 2018
BIS Quarterly
Review | 05 junio
2018
La edición
de junio únicamente recoge información sobre las estadísticas del BPI, en
concreto los suplementos estadísticos. La información sobre la evolución
de los acontecimientos financieros se incluirá en su Informe Económico Anual
2018, cuya publicación está prevista para el 24 de junio.
Evolución de los mercados bancarios
y financieros internacionales
El
mercado de swaps de incumplimiento crediticio: cuántos cambios en tan solo un
decenio Authors: Iñaki Aldasoro and Torsten Ehlers pdf version (524kb) A lo largo del último decenio se han
producido cambios notables en el tamaño y la estructura del mercado mundial de
swaps de incumplimiento crediticio (CDS). Con la ayuda de las estadísticas del
BPI sobre derivados, en el presente artículo documentamos el descenso de los
importes vigentes, el auge de la compensación centralizada y la evolución de la
composición de las exposiciones de riesgo de crédito subyacentes. La
compensación por saldos netos (neteo) de los contratos de CDS se ha
incrementado al coincidir un aumento de la proporción de contratos sobre
índices estandarizados y la compensación de estos a través de entidades de
contrapartida central. A su vez, esto ha favorecido una nueva reducción del
riesgo de contraparte. Los riesgos de crédito subyacentes se han desplazado
hacia títulos soberanos y carteras de valores de referencia con mejores
calificaciones crediticias. La distribución de los riesgos de crédito entre
categorías de contrapartes prácticamente no ha cambiado
https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1806_es.htm
---------------
La próxima
crisis financiera (cómo y cuándo ocurrirá según 26 expertos) . https://lnkd.in/ggWPiE7
Via @FocusEconomics
-
2.How and when will the next financial crisis happen?
- 26 experts weigh in
¿Cómo y cuándo se
producirá la próxima crisis financiera? - 26 expertos opinan
-
It is often stated that there
is a major financial crisis every 10 years or so. Having said that, it’s
been a little over a decade since the Lehman Brothers collapse sparked the last
global financial crisis (GFC) and with global economic growth starting to
show signs of petering out, some in the media and
elsewhere in the public eye are forecasting another global financial crisis in
the very near future.
There has been a variety of
reports from prominent analysts lately with predictions as to when the next
crisis will hit and what will spark it. Strategists at J.P. Morgan Chase
recently made a splash with their announcement of a new predictive model that
pencils in the next crisis to hit in 2020. Additionally, J.P. Morgan’s Global
Head of Macro Quantitative and Derivatives Research, Marko Kolanovic, has
highlighted a potential precipitous decline in stocks that could cause what has
been termed “the Great Liquidity Crisis.” He identified the shift away from
actively managed investing toward passive investing strategies such as
exchange-traded funds, index funds and quantitative-based trading strategies,
as well as computerized trading as the potential culprit, which could not only
be the catalyst for the next crisis but could also exacerbate the fallout.
A menudo se afirma que hay una crisis financiera importante cada 10 años aproximadamente. Dicho esto, ha pasado poco más de una década desde que el colapso de Lehman Brothers desencadenó la última crisis financiera mundial (GFC) y con el crecimiento económico mundial comenzando a mostrar signos de deterioro, algunos en los medios de comunicación y en otros lugares a la vista del público están pronosticando otra crisis financiera mundial en un futuro muy cercano.
Últimamente ha habido una variedad de informes de analistas prominentes con predicciones sobre cuándo llegará la próxima crisis y qué la desencadenará. Los estrategas de J.P. Morgan Chase causaron sensación recientemente con su anuncio de un nuevo modelo de predicción que marcará la próxima crisis que se producirá en 2020. Además, el Director Global de Investigación Macro Cuantitativa y de Derivados de J.P. Morgan, Marko Kolanovic, ha destacado una posible caída precipitada de las acciones que podría causar lo que se ha denominado "la Gran Crisis de Liquidez". Identificó el cambio de la inversión gestionada activamente hacia estrategias de inversión pasiva, como los fondos cotizados en bolsa, los fondos indexados y las estrategias comerciales basadas en la cantidad, así como el comercio informatizado, como posibles culpables, lo que no sólo podría ser el catalizador de la próxima crisis, sino que también podría exacerbar las consecuencias.
A menudo se afirma que hay una crisis financiera importante cada 10 años aproximadamente. Dicho esto, ha pasado poco más de una década desde que el colapso de Lehman Brothers desencadenó la última crisis financiera mundial (GFC) y con el crecimiento económico mundial comenzando a mostrar signos de deterioro, algunos en los medios de comunicación y en otros lugares a la vista del público están pronosticando otra crisis financiera mundial en un futuro muy cercano.
Últimamente ha habido una variedad de informes de analistas prominentes con predicciones sobre cuándo llegará la próxima crisis y qué la desencadenará. Los estrategas de J.P. Morgan Chase causaron sensación recientemente con su anuncio de un nuevo modelo de predicción que marcará la próxima crisis que se producirá en 2020. Además, el Director Global de Investigación Macro Cuantitativa y de Derivados de J.P. Morgan, Marko Kolanovic, ha destacado una posible caída precipitada de las acciones que podría causar lo que se ha denominado "la Gran Crisis de Liquidez". Identificó el cambio de la inversión gestionada activamente hacia estrategias de inversión pasiva, como los fondos cotizados en bolsa, los fondos indexados y las estrategias comerciales basadas en la cantidad, así como el comercio informatizado, como posibles culpables, lo que no sólo podría ser el catalizador de la próxima crisis, sino que también podría exacerbar las consecuencias.
According to Joyce Chang and
Jan Loeys of J.P. Morgan, “The shift from active to passive asset management,
and specifically the decline of active value investors, reduces the ability of
the market to prevent and recover from large drawdowns.” Passive investing
strategies have removed a pool of buyers who can swoop in if valuations tumble,
while many of these computerized trading programs are designed to sell
automatically when weakness shows, which would only worsen the situation.
Others have cited the increase
in fast-growing pockets of debt. Students in the U.S. are borrowing at record
levels, companies are loading up on debt, and emerging markets also appear to
be gorging themselves on cheap debt. Although these pockets of debt are nowhere
near the levels of the U.S. housing bubble, according to a report by the New
York Times, some are concerned that this accumulation of debt could
potentially spur the next crisis, just like it did the last one.
“What we saw last time around
is that things can creep up on you […] you can turn around and in three years’
time you can go from not much of a problem to a pretty big problem,” according
to Wesley Phoa, a bond-fund manager at the Capital Group.
Still others have stated that
deregulation could bring on the next financial crisis. Specifically, the
rolling-back of Barack Obama-era regulations put in place in the wake of the
2008 crash, namely the Dodd-Frank Act. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Protection Act was designed to put major regulation on the financial industry
to curb the kind of excessive risk-taking that contributed to the GFC.
"I'm afraid because of
the political situation in the U.S. today, we're moving in the wrong direction
of reducing regulation. We should've learned that more regulation is
needed," said Lawrence Ball, the Johns Hopkins University economics
professor. "What we also should've learned is the last resort in a crisis
is for the Federal Reserve to lend money. And that, unfortunately, is unpopular
as well."
Others have pointed to the
China-U.S. trade war, the move toward protectionist trade policies in general
around the world, and even the possibility of a cyber attack taking down
the global financial system as possible causes of the next crisis. With
that said, we decided to ask 26 economic and financial market experts
what they believe will be the catalyst for the next financial crisis and when
they think it could happen.
-
-
Click on the names below to
jump to their answers or scroll down to read each one-by-one.
-
-
This Fall marks ten years
since the most acute months of the longest recession since the Great
Depression. According to the National Bureau of Economic Research, the last economic downturn began in December 2007 and ended 18 months
later, in June 2009. If the expansion lasts until June of next year, it will
become the longest since records began.
As the duration of
uninterrupted output growth increases, more people are asking when the next
recession is “due”, and what the source of a future downturn might be.
Is another crisis imminent?
There are indications that we may be nearing a cyclical peak: Unemployment is
at a 50-year low and
inflation has exceeded the Federal Reserve’s 2-percent target over the last 12 months -
both signs that the U.S. economy is operating at capacity. Stock markets appear
to have begun a period of downward correction from all-time highs. Continued
trade tensions and further increases in the Fed’s interest rate target both
make a decline in stock and bond prices more likely.
Yet, other indicators point to
a longer-lived cycle than we might otherwise expect. The labor force
participation rate, while recently ticking upward, remains three percentage points below pre-crisis levels. GDP growth in the second quarter was a robust
(annualized) 4.2 percent, the consequence - depending on whom you ask - of
productivity- and investment-enhancing tax cuts, or of deficit spending by the
federal government. Consumer confidence rose to an 18-year high in August. Business sentiment is also at a post-crisis peak.
There are other reasons to
expect the current bout of growth to last longer than its precedents. The
post-2009 recovery was sluggish - the slowest, in fact, since at least 1948. U.S. GDP took three years to return to 2007
levels; employment took six years to recover, again a record. Given this slow
start, it stands to reason that the economy will take longer to reach capacity.
The financial crisis and the
regulators’ response to it also led to a retrenchment by financial institutions
from mortgage lending, small business loans, and other credit markets. That
retrenchment may partly explain the slow growth in production
and wages after the crisis, and it may also help to delay the next recession by
curbing the enthusiasm of businesses and investors. On the whole, however, the
decline of banking activity post-2008 is regrettable.
What will cause the next
recession, and when? Economists have as spotty a record of prediction as other
forecasters. Yet, some have pointed to corporate borrowing - buoyed by record-low interest rates - as a potential point of failure.
Others suggest that student loans, which have grown relentlessly since 2008 and have high default rates and
uncertain payoffs, may pose a systemic risk.
Outstanding corporate lending
to the most indebted firms, however, is a fraction of the pre-crisis U.S. mortgage credit market - and less than half the
level of subprime lending at that time. Nor are business loans subject to the
same government-mandated subsidies and interest-rate distortions as housing
credit. Moreover, the correlation between risks faced by today’s most heavily
indebted firms may be less than what we witnessed across American housing
markets in the run-up to 2008.
Student loans, at $1.5 trillion outstanding, are also a concern. They enjoy taxpayer backing, which means they pose
less of a systemic risk, as the burden of defaults will not be absorbed by
private financial markets. That burden will instead fall on taxpayer shoulders,
however, meaning that the U.S. national debt will grow by up to 7 percent of
GDP. A bailout of student loans would therefore raise concerns about fairness,
while running counter to the prudent management of the budget.
Indeed, the biggest risks may
lie with public, not private, balance sheets. With the national debt held by
the public at $16 trillion and set to grow by $779 billion this year, it is the public sector that is living beyond
its means. Some dismiss warnings about the unsustainability of the present debt path with the argument that America issues its own
currency, so can pay down its liabilities through money-printing. Yet such debt
monetization would either cause high inflation, contradicting the Fed’s mission
and undermining long-term confidence in the U.S. economy, or it would result in
large-scale capital reallocation, with negative effects on growth.
The source and timing of the
next crisis remain uncertain, but policymakers have their work cut out for
them: They must rein in government spending.
Diego Zuluaga is a policy analyst at the Cato Institute’s Center for Monetary
and Financial Alternatives, where he
covers financial technology and consumer credit. He also wrtes for Alt-M, one of the FocusEconomics Top Economics and Finanace blogs. You can follow Diego on
Twitter here.
Diego Zuluaga
Este otoño marca diez años desde los meses más agudos de la recesión más larga desde la Gran Depresión. Según la Oficina Nacional de Investigaciones Económicas, la última recesión económica comenzó en diciembre de 2007 y terminó 18 meses después, en junio de 2009. Si la expansión dura hasta junio del próximo año, será la más larga desde que comenzaron los registros.
A medida que aumenta la duración del crecimiento ininterrumpido de la producción, más personas se preguntan cuándo "vencerá" la próxima recesión y cuál podría ser la fuente de una futura recesión.
¿Es inminente otra crisis?
Hay indicios de que nos acercamos a un pico cíclico: El desempleo se encuentra en su nivel más bajo de los últimos 50 años y la inflación ha superado la meta del 2 por ciento de la Reserva Federal en los últimos 12 meses, lo que indica que la economía de Estados Unidos está operando a pleno rendimiento. Los mercados de valores parecen haber iniciado un período de corrección a la baja desde los máximos históricos. Las continuas tensiones comerciales y los nuevos aumentos en el objetivo de los tipos de interés de la Reserva Federal hacen más probable un descenso de los precios de las acciones y de los bonos.
Sin embargo, otros indicadores apuntan a un ciclo de vida más largo de lo que cabría esperar. La tasa de participación en la fuerza de trabajo, aunque recientemente está aumentando, sigue estando tres puntos porcentuales por debajo de los niveles anteriores a la crisis. El crecimiento del PIB en el segundo trimestre fue de un sólido 4,2 por ciento (anualizado), como consecuencia, dependiendo de a quién se le pregunte, de los recortes de impuestos para aumentar la productividad y la inversión, o del gasto deficitario del gobierno federal. La confianza de los consumidores alcanzó su nivel más alto de los últimos 18 años en agosto. El sentimiento empresarial también se encuentra en su punto álgido después de la crisis.
Hay otras razones para esperar que el actual período de crecimiento dure más que sus precedentes. La recuperación posterior a 2009 fue lenta, la más lenta, de hecho, desde al menos 1948. El PIB de Estados Unidos tardó tres años en volver a los niveles de 2007; el empleo tardó seis años en recuperarse, de nuevo un récord. Dada esta lentitud, es lógico que la economía tardará más tiempo en alcanzar su capacidad.
La crisis financiera y la respuesta de los reguladores a la misma también condujeron a un recorte de las instituciones financieras de los préstamos hipotecarios, los préstamos a pequeñas empresas y otros mercados crediticios. Este recorte puede explicar en parte el lento crecimiento de la producción y de los salarios tras la crisis, y también puede contribuir a retrasar la próxima recesión al frenar el entusiasmo de las empresas y de los inversores. Sin embargo, en general, el descenso de la actividad bancaria después de 2008 es lamentable.
¿Qué causará la próxima recesión y cuándo?
Los economistas tienen un historial de predicción tan irregular como otros pronosticadores. Sin embargo, algunos han señalado que el endeudamiento de las empresas, impulsado por unos tipos de interés sin precedentes, puede ser un punto de quiebra. Otros sugieren que los préstamos estudiantiles, que han crecido implacablemente desde 2008 y tienen altas tasas de incumplimiento y pagos inciertos, pueden plantear un riesgo sistémico.
Sin embargo, los préstamos corporativos pendientes a las empresas más endeudadas representan una fracción del mercado de crédito hipotecario de Estados Unidos anterior a la crisis, y menos de la mitad del nivel de los préstamos de alto riesgo en ese momento. Los préstamos a empresas tampoco están sujetos a los mismos subsidios y distorsiones de las tasas de interés que los créditos para la vivienda establecidos por el gobierno. Además, la correlación entre los riesgos a los que se enfrentan las empresas más endeudadas de la actualidad puede ser menor que la que observamos en los mercados inmobiliarios estadounidenses en el período previo a 2008.
Los préstamos estudiantiles, con un saldo pendiente de 1,5 billones de dólares, también son motivo de preocupación. Disfrutan del respaldo de los contribuyentes, lo que significa que suponen un riesgo sistémico menor, ya que la carga de los impagos no será absorbida por los mercados financieros privados. Sin embargo, esa carga recaerá en los hombros de los contribuyentes, lo que significa que la deuda nacional de Estados Unidos crecerá hasta en un 7 por ciento del PIB. Por lo tanto, un rescate de los préstamos estudiantiles suscitaría preocupación por la equidad, al tiempo que iría en contra de una gestión prudente del presupuesto.
De hecho, los mayores riesgos pueden residir en los balances públicos, no en los privados. Con una deuda pública de 16 billones de dólares y un crecimiento de 779.000 millones de dólares este año, es el sector público el que vive por encima de sus posibilidades. Algunos rechazan las advertencias sobre la insostenibilidad de la actual trayectoria de la deuda con el argumento de que Estados Unidos emite su propia moneda, por lo que puede pagar sus pasivos mediante la impresión de dinero. Sin embargo, tal monetización de la deuda o bien causaría una alta inflación, contradiciendo la misión de la Reserva Federal y socavando la confianza a largo plazo en la economía de Estados Unidos, o bien resultaría en una reasignación de capital a gran escala, con efectos negativos sobre el crecimiento.
El origen y el calendario de la próxima crisis siguen siendo inciertos, pero los responsables políticos tienen mucho trabajo por delante: Deben controlar el gasto del gobierno.
-
Diego Zuluaga es analista de políticas en el Centro de Alternativas Monetarias y Financieras del Instituto Cato
Diego Zuluaga
Este otoño marca diez años desde los meses más agudos de la recesión más larga desde la Gran Depresión. Según la Oficina Nacional de Investigaciones Económicas, la última recesión económica comenzó en diciembre de 2007 y terminó 18 meses después, en junio de 2009. Si la expansión dura hasta junio del próximo año, será la más larga desde que comenzaron los registros.
A medida que aumenta la duración del crecimiento ininterrumpido de la producción, más personas se preguntan cuándo "vencerá" la próxima recesión y cuál podría ser la fuente de una futura recesión.
¿Es inminente otra crisis?
Hay indicios de que nos acercamos a un pico cíclico: El desempleo se encuentra en su nivel más bajo de los últimos 50 años y la inflación ha superado la meta del 2 por ciento de la Reserva Federal en los últimos 12 meses, lo que indica que la economía de Estados Unidos está operando a pleno rendimiento. Los mercados de valores parecen haber iniciado un período de corrección a la baja desde los máximos históricos. Las continuas tensiones comerciales y los nuevos aumentos en el objetivo de los tipos de interés de la Reserva Federal hacen más probable un descenso de los precios de las acciones y de los bonos.
Sin embargo, otros indicadores apuntan a un ciclo de vida más largo de lo que cabría esperar. La tasa de participación en la fuerza de trabajo, aunque recientemente está aumentando, sigue estando tres puntos porcentuales por debajo de los niveles anteriores a la crisis. El crecimiento del PIB en el segundo trimestre fue de un sólido 4,2 por ciento (anualizado), como consecuencia, dependiendo de a quién se le pregunte, de los recortes de impuestos para aumentar la productividad y la inversión, o del gasto deficitario del gobierno federal. La confianza de los consumidores alcanzó su nivel más alto de los últimos 18 años en agosto. El sentimiento empresarial también se encuentra en su punto álgido después de la crisis.
Hay otras razones para esperar que el actual período de crecimiento dure más que sus precedentes. La recuperación posterior a 2009 fue lenta, la más lenta, de hecho, desde al menos 1948. El PIB de Estados Unidos tardó tres años en volver a los niveles de 2007; el empleo tardó seis años en recuperarse, de nuevo un récord. Dada esta lentitud, es lógico que la economía tardará más tiempo en alcanzar su capacidad.
La crisis financiera y la respuesta de los reguladores a la misma también condujeron a un recorte de las instituciones financieras de los préstamos hipotecarios, los préstamos a pequeñas empresas y otros mercados crediticios. Este recorte puede explicar en parte el lento crecimiento de la producción y de los salarios tras la crisis, y también puede contribuir a retrasar la próxima recesión al frenar el entusiasmo de las empresas y de los inversores. Sin embargo, en general, el descenso de la actividad bancaria después de 2008 es lamentable.
¿Qué causará la próxima recesión y cuándo?
Los economistas tienen un historial de predicción tan irregular como otros pronosticadores. Sin embargo, algunos han señalado que el endeudamiento de las empresas, impulsado por unos tipos de interés sin precedentes, puede ser un punto de quiebra. Otros sugieren que los préstamos estudiantiles, que han crecido implacablemente desde 2008 y tienen altas tasas de incumplimiento y pagos inciertos, pueden plantear un riesgo sistémico.
Sin embargo, los préstamos corporativos pendientes a las empresas más endeudadas representan una fracción del mercado de crédito hipotecario de Estados Unidos anterior a la crisis, y menos de la mitad del nivel de los préstamos de alto riesgo en ese momento. Los préstamos a empresas tampoco están sujetos a los mismos subsidios y distorsiones de las tasas de interés que los créditos para la vivienda establecidos por el gobierno. Además, la correlación entre los riesgos a los que se enfrentan las empresas más endeudadas de la actualidad puede ser menor que la que observamos en los mercados inmobiliarios estadounidenses en el período previo a 2008.
Los préstamos estudiantiles, con un saldo pendiente de 1,5 billones de dólares, también son motivo de preocupación. Disfrutan del respaldo de los contribuyentes, lo que significa que suponen un riesgo sistémico menor, ya que la carga de los impagos no será absorbida por los mercados financieros privados. Sin embargo, esa carga recaerá en los hombros de los contribuyentes, lo que significa que la deuda nacional de Estados Unidos crecerá hasta en un 7 por ciento del PIB. Por lo tanto, un rescate de los préstamos estudiantiles suscitaría preocupación por la equidad, al tiempo que iría en contra de una gestión prudente del presupuesto.
De hecho, los mayores riesgos pueden residir en los balances públicos, no en los privados. Con una deuda pública de 16 billones de dólares y un crecimiento de 779.000 millones de dólares este año, es el sector público el que vive por encima de sus posibilidades. Algunos rechazan las advertencias sobre la insostenibilidad de la actual trayectoria de la deuda con el argumento de que Estados Unidos emite su propia moneda, por lo que puede pagar sus pasivos mediante la impresión de dinero. Sin embargo, tal monetización de la deuda o bien causaría una alta inflación, contradiciendo la misión de la Reserva Federal y socavando la confianza a largo plazo en la economía de Estados Unidos, o bien resultaría en una reasignación de capital a gran escala, con efectos negativos sobre el crecimiento.
El origen y el calendario de la próxima crisis siguen siendo inciertos, pero los responsables políticos tienen mucho trabajo por delante: Deben controlar el gasto del gobierno.
-
Diego Zuluaga es analista de políticas en el Centro de Alternativas Monetarias y Financieras del Instituto Cato
The question is not whether
there will be a crisis, but when. In the past fifty years, we have seen more
than eight global crises and many more local ones, so the likelihood of another
one is quite high. Not just because of the years passed since the 2007 crisis,
but because the factors that drive a global crisis are all lining up.
[...]
What are the main factors that
could trigger the next financial crisis?
- Sovereign Debt. The riskiest asset today is sovereign bonds at abnormally low yields, compressed by central bank policies. With $6.5 trillion in negative-yielding bonds, the nominal and real losses in pension funds will likely be added to the losses in other asset classes.
- Incorrect perception of liquidity and VaR. Years of high asset correlation and synchronised bubble led by sovereign debt have led investors to believe that there is always a massive amount of liquidity waiting to buy the dips to catch the rally. This is simply a myth. That “massive liquidity” is just leverage and when margin calls and losses start to appear in different areas -emerging markets, European equities, US tech stocks- the liquidity that most investors count on to continue to fuel the rally simply vanishes. Why? Because VaR (value at risk) is also incorrectly calculated. When assets reach an abnormal level of correlation and volatility is dampened due to massive central bank asset purchases, the analysis of risk and probable losses is simply ineffective, because when markets fall they fall in tandem, as we are seeing these days, and the historical analysis of losses is contaminated by the massive impact of monetary policy actions in those years. When the biggest driver of asset price inflation, central banks, starts to unwind or simply becomes part of the expected liquidity -like in Japan-, the placebo effect of monetary policy on risky assets vanishes. And losses pile up.
- The fallacy of synchronised growth triggered the beginning of what could lead to the next recession. A generalized belief that monetary policy had been very effective, growth was robust and generalized, and debt increases where just a collateral damage but not a global concern. And with the fallacy of synchronised growth came the excess complacency and the acceleration of imbalances. The 2007 crisis erupted because in 2005 and 2006 even the most prudent investors gave up and surrendered to the rising-market beta chase. In 2017 it was accelerated by the incorrect belief that emerging markets were fine because their stocks and bonds were soaring despite the Federal reserve normalization
What will the next crisis look
like?
Nothing like the last one, in
my opinion. Contagion is much more difficult because there have been some
lessons learnt from the Lehman crisis. There are stronger mechanisms to avoid a
widespread domino effect in the banking system.
When the biggest bubble is
sovereign debt the crisis we face is not one of massive financial market losses
and real economy contagion, but a slow fall in asset prices, as we are seeing,
and global stagnation.
The next crisis is not likely
to be another Lehman, but another Japan, a widespread zombification of global
economies to avoid the pain of a large re-pricing of sovereign bonds, that
leads to massive tax hikes to pay the rising interests, economic recession and
unemployment.
The risks are obviously
difficult to analyse because the world entered into the biggest monetary
experiment in history with no understanding of the side effects and real risks
attached. Governments and central banks saw rising markets above fundamental
levels and record levels of debt as collateral damages, small but acceptable
problems in the quest for a synchronised growth that was never going to happen.
The next crisis, like the
2007-08 one, will be blamed on a symptom (Lehman in that case), not the real
cause (aggressive monetary policy incentivising risk-taking and penalising
prudence). The next crisis, however, will find central banks with almost no
real tools to disguise structural problems with liquidity, and no fiscal space
in a world where most economies are running fiscal deficits for the tenth
consecutive year and global debt is at all-time highs.
When will it happen? We do not
know, but if the warning signs of 2018 are not taken seriously, it will likely
occur earlier than expected. But the governments and central banks will not
blame themselves, they will present themselves -again- as the solution.
Daniel Lacalle is Chief
Economist at Tressis, professor of global economy and author of “Escape from the Central Bank Trap”.
-
-
La
cuestión no es si habrá una crisis, sino cuándo. En los últimos
cincuenta años, hemos visto más de ocho crisis mundiales y muchas más
locales, por lo que la probabilidad de que se produzca otra es bastante
alta. No sólo por los años transcurridos desde la crisis de 2007, sino
porque los factores que impulsan una crisis mundial se están alineando.
[...]
¿Cuáles son los principales factores que podrían desencadenar la próxima crisis financiera?
- Deuda soberana. El activo de mayor riesgo en la actualidad son los bonos soberanos con rendimientos anormalmente bajos, comprimidos por las políticas del banco central. Con 6,5 billones de dólares en bonos de rendimiento negativo, es probable que las pérdidas nominales y reales de los fondos de pensiones se sumen a las pérdidas de otras clases de activos.
- Percepción incorrecta de la liquidez y del VaR. Años de alta correlación de activos y burbuja sincronizada liderada por la deuda soberana han llevado a los inversores a creer que siempre hay una enorme cantidad de liquidez a la espera de comprar las caídas para alcanzar la recuperación. Esto es simplemente un mito. Esa "liquidez masiva" no es más que un apalancamiento y cuando empiezan a aparecer llamadas de margen y pérdidas en diferentes áreas -mercados emergentes, renta variable europea, valores tecnológicos estadounidenses- la liquidez con la que cuentan la mayoría de los inversores para seguir alimentando la recuperación simplemente desaparece. Por qué? Porque el VaR (valor en riesgo) también se calcula incorrectamente. Cuando los activos alcanzan un nivel anormal de correlación y la volatilidad se ve atenuada por las compras masivas de activos de los bancos centrales, el análisis del riesgo y de las pérdidas probables es simplemente ineficaz, porque cuando los mercados caen caen en tándem, como estamos viendo en estos días, y el análisis histórico de las pérdidas se contamina por el impacto masivo de las acciones de política monetaria en esos años. Cuando el mayor impulsor de la inflación de los precios de los activos, los bancos centrales, comienza a relajarse o simplemente pasa a formar parte de la liquidez esperada -como en Japón-, el efecto placebo de la política monetaria sobre los activos de riesgo desaparece. Y las pérdidas se acumulan.
[...]
¿Cuáles son los principales factores que podrían desencadenar la próxima crisis financiera?
- Deuda soberana. El activo de mayor riesgo en la actualidad son los bonos soberanos con rendimientos anormalmente bajos, comprimidos por las políticas del banco central. Con 6,5 billones de dólares en bonos de rendimiento negativo, es probable que las pérdidas nominales y reales de los fondos de pensiones se sumen a las pérdidas de otras clases de activos.
- Percepción incorrecta de la liquidez y del VaR. Años de alta correlación de activos y burbuja sincronizada liderada por la deuda soberana han llevado a los inversores a creer que siempre hay una enorme cantidad de liquidez a la espera de comprar las caídas para alcanzar la recuperación. Esto es simplemente un mito. Esa "liquidez masiva" no es más que un apalancamiento y cuando empiezan a aparecer llamadas de margen y pérdidas en diferentes áreas -mercados emergentes, renta variable europea, valores tecnológicos estadounidenses- la liquidez con la que cuentan la mayoría de los inversores para seguir alimentando la recuperación simplemente desaparece. Por qué? Porque el VaR (valor en riesgo) también se calcula incorrectamente. Cuando los activos alcanzan un nivel anormal de correlación y la volatilidad se ve atenuada por las compras masivas de activos de los bancos centrales, el análisis del riesgo y de las pérdidas probables es simplemente ineficaz, porque cuando los mercados caen caen en tándem, como estamos viendo en estos días, y el análisis histórico de las pérdidas se contamina por el impacto masivo de las acciones de política monetaria en esos años. Cuando el mayor impulsor de la inflación de los precios de los activos, los bancos centrales, comienza a relajarse o simplemente pasa a formar parte de la liquidez esperada -como en Japón-, el efecto placebo de la política monetaria sobre los activos de riesgo desaparece. Y las pérdidas se acumulan.
-- La falacia del crecimiento sincronizado
desencadenó el comienzo de lo que podría conducir a la próxima
recesión. Una creencia generalizada de que la política monetaria había
sido muy eficaz, el crecimiento era sólido y generalizado, y la deuda
aumentaba cuando sólo era un daño colateral, pero no una preocupación
mundial. Y con la falacia del crecimiento sincronizado vino la excesiva
complacencia y la aceleración de los desequilibrios. La crisis de 2007
estalló porque en 2005 y 2006 incluso los inversores más prudentes se
dieron por vencidos y se rindieron a la creciente persecución del
mercado beta. En 2017 se aceleró por la creencia incorrecta de que los
mercados emergentes estaban bien porque sus acciones y bonos se
dispararon a pesar de la normalización de la Reserva Federal.
-
¿Cómo será la próxima crisis?
No sera como la ultima, en mi opinión. El contagio es mucho más difícil porque se han aprendido algunas lecciones de la crisis de Lehman. Existen mecanismos más fuertes para evitar un efecto dominó generalizado en el sistema bancario.
Cuando la mayor burbuja es la deuda soberana, la crisis a la que nos enfrentamos no es una de pérdidas masivas en los mercados financieros y el contagio de la economía real, sino una lenta caída de los precios de los activos, como estamos viendo, y el estancamiento mundial.
No es probable que la próxima crisis sea otro Lehman, sino otro Japón, una zombificación generalizada de las economías globales para evitar el dolor de una gran revalorización de los bonos soberanos, que conduce a subidas masivas de impuestos para pagar los crecientes intereses, la recesión económica y el desempleo.
Los riesgos son obviamente difíciles de analizar porque el mundo entró en el mayor experimento monetario de la historia sin comprender los efectos secundarios y los riesgos reales asociados. Los gobiernos y los bancos centrales consideraron que el aumento de los mercados por encima de los niveles fundamentales y los niveles récord de deuda eran daños colaterales, problemas pequeños pero aceptables en la búsqueda de un crecimiento sincronizado que nunca iba a ocurrir.
¿Cómo será la próxima crisis?
No sera como la ultima, en mi opinión. El contagio es mucho más difícil porque se han aprendido algunas lecciones de la crisis de Lehman. Existen mecanismos más fuertes para evitar un efecto dominó generalizado en el sistema bancario.
Cuando la mayor burbuja es la deuda soberana, la crisis a la que nos enfrentamos no es una de pérdidas masivas en los mercados financieros y el contagio de la economía real, sino una lenta caída de los precios de los activos, como estamos viendo, y el estancamiento mundial.
No es probable que la próxima crisis sea otro Lehman, sino otro Japón, una zombificación generalizada de las economías globales para evitar el dolor de una gran revalorización de los bonos soberanos, que conduce a subidas masivas de impuestos para pagar los crecientes intereses, la recesión económica y el desempleo.
Los riesgos son obviamente difíciles de analizar porque el mundo entró en el mayor experimento monetario de la historia sin comprender los efectos secundarios y los riesgos reales asociados. Los gobiernos y los bancos centrales consideraron que el aumento de los mercados por encima de los niveles fundamentales y los niveles récord de deuda eran daños colaterales, problemas pequeños pero aceptables en la búsqueda de un crecimiento sincronizado que nunca iba a ocurrir.
-
La próxima crisis, como la de 2007-08, será atribuida a un síntoma (Lehman en ese caso), no a la causa real (una política monetaria agresiva que incentive la asunción de riesgos y penalice la prudencia). La próxima crisis, sin embargo, encontrará bancos centrales con casi ninguna herramienta real para disimular problemas estructurales de liquidez, y sin espacio fiscal en un mundo en el que la mayoría de las economías están registrando déficits fiscales por décimo año consecutivo y la deuda mundial se encuentra en su nivel más alto de todos los tiempos.
La próxima crisis, como la de 2007-08, será atribuida a un síntoma (Lehman en ese caso), no a la causa real (una política monetaria agresiva que incentive la asunción de riesgos y penalice la prudencia). La próxima crisis, sin embargo, encontrará bancos centrales con casi ninguna herramienta real para disimular problemas estructurales de liquidez, y sin espacio fiscal en un mundo en el que la mayoría de las economías están registrando déficits fiscales por décimo año consecutivo y la deuda mundial se encuentra en su nivel más alto de todos los tiempos.
-
¿Cuándo sucederá?
¿Cuándo sucederá?
No lo sabemos, pero si no se toman en serio las señales de alerta de 2018,
es probable que ocurra antes de lo esperado. Pero los gobiernos y los
bancos centrales no se culparán a sí mismos, sino que se presentarán
-una vez más- como la solución.
It is my view that the next financial crisis is looming on the horizon
resulting from the "tariff war"; the specific timeline will depend on
how quickly tariffs (and retaliatory tariffs) are implemented as well as how
quickly businesses and people react to them. Because higher tariffs may trigger
inflation (and expectations thereof), higher interest rates may ensue.
En mi opinión, la próxima crisis financiera se vislumbra en el horizonte como resultado de la "guerra arancelaria"; el calendario específico dependerá de la rapidez con que se apliquen los aranceles (y los aranceles de represalia), así como de la rapidez con que las empresas y las personas reaccionen ante ellos. Debido a que el aumento de los aranceles puede desencadenar la inflación (y las expectativas de la misma), es posible que se produzcan tasas de interés más altas.
En mi opinión, la próxima crisis financiera se vislumbra en el horizonte como resultado de la "guerra arancelaria"; el calendario específico dependerá de la rapidez con que se apliquen los aranceles (y los aranceles de represalia), así como de la rapidez con que las empresas y las personas reaccionen ante ellos. Debido a que el aumento de los aranceles puede desencadenar la inflación (y las expectativas de la misma), es posible que se produzcan tasas de interés más altas.
Marie Mora, PhD, is a professor of economics at the University of Texas Rio
Grande Valley and Director of the NSF-funded AEA Mentoring Program.
The Next Financial Crisis
could be closer than we think. . .
While the global economy, and
most certainly the U.S. economy, are enjoying a healthy and robust expansion,
there are clouds on the horizon that spell trouble.
The first of these clouds is
the trade war that the Trump Administration has started with China. Both
nations rely heavily on each other and trade disruption will have a severe
economic impact on both. The United States relies on the low-cost
products imported from China which allows its consumer-based economy to
thrive. China must sell products to its biggest customer, the United
States, in order to be able to keep its economy growing at a healthy
pace. Tariffs and trade protectionism will mean an economic slowdown for
both countries and an eventual recession that neither can afford.
The other clouds come in the
form of bubbles, that if a recession were to occur in the next 18 to 24 months
will doom both the American and world economies. These bubbles include the:
- Credit card debt situation in which American consumers have charged over $1.03 trillion on their line of revolving credit. If a major recession were to hit soon, these consumers will either stop using their credit cards or not pay them back. The global markets will react negatively and many retailers, both brick-and-mortar and e-commerce, will probably close down their operations.
- Auto loans now total over $1 trillion and American consumers have gotten into deep debt on vehicles they can no longer afford. If consumers renege on their auto loans, banks, finance companies, and asset-backed securities will suffer tremendous losses that will rattle the financial markets. This will also cause a severe glut of new or nearly-new repossessed cars flooding the market and cause car prices to drop drastically.
- Student loans have exceeded $1 trillion and there does not seem to be any end in sight. As the cost of a college education increases every year, more American families are going deeper into debt to pay for their children’s education. If the child cannot pay back the loan because there are no jobs after graduation, or the parents are too deep in debt to repay the loan, this will cause difficulties for the American economy.
- The American stock market has seen new heights in the Dow Jones Industrial Average, the S&P 500, and the NASDAQ indices. But with the recent downward slides of these indices, the bubble may have finally burst and investors are worried. A bursting of the stock market bubble could mean that companies will rethink plans for expansion of their operations, hiring more workers, or improving their products or services. This will halt the flow of financial capital into the American economy and become the forerunner of an economic recession many fear is quite near.
Arthur Guarino MBA, MSSc, JD, is an
assistant professor in the Finance and Economics Department at Rutgers
University Business School teaching courses in financial institutions and
markets, corporate finance, investments, and financial statement
analysis.
I am not sure what is meant by
a financial crisis in this context. Will there be some countries or sectors
that face serious financial problems? The answer is sure. We can say that
several developing countries, most notably Argentina and Turkey, are already in
this boat. But if the claim is that there will be some financial crisis that
rocks the world economy, this is just silly. Prior to the crisis caused by the
collapse of the housing bubble, you would have to back more than 70 years to
find a world shaking financial crisis. So the 10-year story clearly does not
fit here. The 2008 crisis could shake the world economy because it was being
driven by housing bubbles in the U.S. and Europe. That is not true today,
although several countries do face a risk from housing bubbles, notable Australia,
Canada, and the UK. If higher interest rates or other factors deflate these
bubbles, their economies are likely to fall into a recession (with or without
financial crises). I don't see this a world-wide story however.
Dean Baker, PhD, is an
American economist and the co-founder and senior economist at the Center for
Economic and Policy Research (CEPR).
I would say 10 years is too
frequent to attribute crises to finances, because it can take almost 10 years
to get out of a financial crisis (one generated by financial imbalances as the
last one is widely believed to have been generated). Japan certainly
experienced a long period of stagnation after their financial crisis. Of
course, in the US, the government is busy dismantling the safe guards that were
put in place so it could happen here sooner, but personally, I don’t expect
that in the next at least 2-3 years. If right on schedule it would have started
in December 2017, which it did not. The current recovery is not as good as it
looks for many actors, especially women, families headed by women alone,
families in depressed communities, both urban and rural, and so on. So, we
definitely have a ways to go, which is why I give the next crisis some time to
emerge as well.
Heidi Hartmann, PhD, is the
President and Founder of the Institue for Women's Policy Research and is also a
Distinguished Economist In-Residence for Gender and Economic Analysis at
American Univeristy in Washington D.C.
The overall questions
surrounding economic policy around the globe, and especially from the US, are a
real source of concern for the outlook right now. The specific market I would
focus on as a source of the next crisis right now are government bond markets.
Many government fiscal policies are in untenable positions and there is little
slack in the system to deal with future crises whether domestic, international,
or global. The timing of such a crisis event depends greatly on perceptions of
market participants, but without radical changes in policy I think a two year horizon
until crisis seems likely.
David T. Flynn, PhD, is the
Department Chair and Professor of Economics and Finance at the University of
North Dakota.
It's been about 10 years since
the last financial crisis. FocusEconomics wants to know if another one is due.
The short answer is yes. In
the last 10 years not a single fundamental economic flaw has been fixed in the
US, Europe, Japan, or China. The Fed was behind the curve for years
contributing to the bubble. Massive rounds of QE in the US, EU, and Japan
created extreme equity and junk bond bubbles. Trump's tariffs are ill-founded
as is Congressional spending wasted on war.
Potential
Catalysts
- Junk Bond Bubble Bursting
- Equity Bubble Bursting
- Italy
- Tariffs
- Brexit
- Pensions
- Housing
- China
Many will blame the Fed. The
Fed is surely to blame, but it is prior bubble-blowing policy, not rate hikes
now that are the problem.
[...]
It does not matter what the
catalyst is actually. And there might not be any catalyst other than simple
exhaustion: The pool of greater fools in stocks, bonds, and housing simply ran
out.
Regardless, I expect all eight
of the above discussion points to be in play when the crisis does hit.
Read the rest of Mish's
piece Eight Reasons a Financial Crisis is
Coming for more of his thoughts on the matter.
Mike Shedlock a.k.a. Mish is a
registered investment advisor representative for SitkaPacific Capital
Management.
There are definitely real
trouble spots in the world that could escalate into a global crisis. These include:
- No resolution of Brexit;
- The escalating trade war between China and the US;
- Antagonisms with Russia growing into threats to use nuclear weapons, and
- Some other unforeseen action precipitated by the US President.
The banks are clearly on a
long enough leash so they could generate another crisis. And despite efforts by
the Republicans to strip away safeguards put in place after the 2008 collapse,
banks are now required to hold more capital than in 2008. So I don't see them
collapsing again in the foreseeable future.
I believe now most worrisome
is the apparent lack of concern within the US government for the huge budget
deficits and resulting debt the Federal government is generating. And Trump is
now talking about a 10% middle income tax cut.
For many decades, the world
has viewed the US dollar and other US debt as the safest investment available.
The reckless disregard for in the US government any sort of fiscal balance
could change all of this overnight. A global rush to liquidate US dollars,
other US debt and other dollar assets could generate a severe financial
crisis.
And I see it being only a
matter of time before this happens.
Elliott Morss, PhD, is an
economic consultant to developing countries on issues of trade, finance,
and environmental preservation.
It is difficult to take a
precise call about the next financial crisis will hit and what the catalyst(s)
will be. The catalysts looks quite similar to the previous 2008 crisis: huge
financial euphoria as seen in financial markets, rise in debt levels of governments
and rebuild of hubris.
Amol Agrawal is an Assistant
Professor at Amrut Mody School of Management, Ahmedabad University.
A characteristic feature of
financial crises is that they arrive when least expected. However, there are
plenty of reasons for concern in the current environment. At an aggregate
global level, the biggest problem is that US interest rates have been held at
low levels for a long period as a response to the Global Financial Crisis. This
has promoted a re-emergence of what’s often called the carry trade: borrowing
at low short term US rates to finance speculative investments of various kinds.
This has extended to what Minsky, the leading theorist of financial crises,
called Ponzi investments, most notably cryptocurrencies, but also the
investment strategies of authoritarian governments like that of Turkey.
As the US Fed begins to raise
interest rates, problems are already emerging, such as the economic crisis in
Turkey and the sharp decline of cryptocurrency markets. However, provided that
the process of returning interest rates to more normal levels is slow and
gradual, it is likely that only Ponzi investors will be harmed, and that the
financial system as a whole will emerge unscathed.
The big risk is that there
will be a rapid increase in interest rates outside the control of monetary
authorities such as the Fed. The most obvious possibility is that Chinese
holdings of US Treasuries could be dumped, either as a move in the trade war or
to secure liquidity in response to a slowdown in China. That could easily
produce a systemic collapse. Hopefully, the Chinese authorities are aware of
this fact and will move cautiously.
John Quiggin is an Australian
laureate fellow in economics and professor at the University of Queensland, and
a board member of the Climate Change Authority of the government of Australia.
The business cycle has become
longer in recent decades. It follows no schedule. Many are itching to call a
cycle top, but the actual evidence does not support that conclusion.
This is possibly the most important
topic for investors, so I have sought those with the best expertise and
records. I have learned three things. First, no one can do an accurate business
cycle forecast more than a year in advance. Even a cursory review of past
records will show that. Second, it is a popular topic for publicity-seekers, so
many newly-minted “experts” are offering a viewpoint. Third, many of those who
have the right tools use too many variables in their forecasts. There are not
enough relevant past cases to apply a large number of independent variables.
Using a lot of variables seems sophisticated, but it actually over-fits the
model to past data.
What do I think? I am careful
not to exaggerate what we can actually conclude. I don’t think we can forecast
more than a year ahead, nor can anyone else. We can safely say that a recession
has not already begun (despite some doomsayer claims) and that the odds against
a recession starting in the next year are 3-1.
And the cause? No one knows
that either, although it usually happens after a pop in the ten-year yield, a
later move in short-term rates via the Fed, and a yield curve inversion. That
process may play out again, but we are early in the story.
Jeff Miller is the President
of New Arc Investments, Inc. and a former professor of advanced research
methods at the University of Wisconsin.
Financial crises happen all
the time. Currently, there are several underway, including in Argentina and
Turkey. A financial crisis is generally limited in impact, unless the economy
where it takes place is very large and very interwoven with the rest of the
world.
The Financial Crisis in the US
– when credit froze up in a credit-dependent economy – became the Global
Financial Crisis because the US economy and banking system are so massive, and
because US investment products, assets, and speculative bets are shuffled far
and wide around the world.
If a financial crisis breaks
loose in China, it will become a global crisis, but likely on a much smaller
scale than the US Financial Crisis since Chinese bonds and other assets and
bets are not nearly as globally distributed as those originating in the US.
A financial crisis in Japan
would rattle the world too.
But a financial crisis in
Italy will not become a global financial crisis. It will be tough on Italy and
perhaps some other Eurozone member states, and it will ruffle some feathers
globally. But that will be it.
Going forward, there will be
many financial crises, and they will be mostly limited to the economy where
they occur. But every now and then there will be a big one.
Wolf Richter is the CEO of
Wolf Street Corp. and the editor-in-chief at Wolf Street. Follow him
on Twitter here.
As with science fiction
writers, economists play “if this goes on” in trying to predict problems. Often
the crisis comes from somewhere entirely different. Equities, Russia, Southeast
Asia, global yield chasing; each time is different but the same.
Given that, I’m going to
predict a crisis from known causes; not just because I can but because we have
seen this movie, too, ca. 1974. It’s time for the sequel, in three-part
disharmony.
The first unforced error is
Interest on Excess Reserves. This was a quaint, arguably academic, problem with
Fed Funds running in the 0.25-0.50% range. With rates running at 2-3% and banks
still paying depositors close to zero, anyone who is not liquidity-constrained
will put their money elsewhere. (I’m talking my book here; I have more money in
Treasury Direct accounts right now than in Savings.) As bank liabilities
decline, balance sheet adjustment is an identity.
Increasing assets, though,
would require greater lending. Unlike equity investors, banks do not “invest”
based on forecast EBITDA, a.k.a. Earnings Before Management, once removed from
reality. Recent years have seen the major publicly-traded corporations return
to the practices of the Nineties and the Noughts: taking more money out of
companies in buybacks and dividends than the year’s earnings. This has been
sustained by corporate debt issuances, at rates and spreads that seem unlikely
to be sustainable in a higher-rate environment, especially given an overall the
lack of R&D investment post-Crisis.
Both above practices have been
sitting out in public, sprawling on park benches and being politely ignored,
the expectation of passersby that the worst case will be “a correction” in the
equity market again. Taking the Dow back to around 21,000 and NASDAQ down
to around 5,000 or so, with similar effects worldwide, would be disruptive, but
it wouldn’t be a crisis, just as 1987 didn’t sustain a crisis.
For that, we need more
complications. Two things happened in 1973. The first was floating
exchange rates finished correcting from long-sustained imbalances. The second
was that energy costs moved closer to their fair market values, also from an
artificially-low level. Firms that expected to spend 10-15% of their
costs on direct (PP&E) and indirect (transport to market) energy expenses
saw those costs double and could not adjust quickly. When expected losses dwarf
menu costs, you change the menu—raise prices, even as your customers are seeing
the same issues on a micro scale. Finding an equilibrium takes time.
Additionally, they are
complications in the Chinese economy, even ignoring a general slowdown in their
growth, there are possible squalls on the horizon. The People’s Republic of
China arose in 1949. As part of that, the land was nationalized and then leased
out by the state—for 70 years. Those leases expire beginning in October of
2019—less than twelve months from now. If Chinese real estate and rental
prices move closer to a fair market value, the consequences of that will have
to be managed domestically, leaving China with limited options in the event of
a global contraction. If the early 1970s taught us anything, it is that an
exogenous shock can wither Aggregate Demand. If the rest of the world repeats
its austerity gaffes and China cannot stimulate, whither Aggregate Demand?
Corporations continue not to
invest, banks continue not provide viable investment options, and demand
continues to slow in the face of rising global interest rates. Throw in an
overdue adjustment in Chinese real estate costs bringing headwinds to the most
successful growth story of the past decade, and there is likely to be
“disruption.” The aftershocks of those events will determine the size of the
crisis; whether it will occur seems only a question of timing.
Ken Houghton is
a principle in his own company and former economist for several major
financial companies. He is a regular contributor to Angry Bear.
There are two different types
of extreme financial events; one is a crisis, the other isn't. In 2008, banks
and other financial firms were so highly leveraged that a modest decline in
housing prices across the country led to a wave of bankruptcies and fears of
bankruptcy. By contrast, the dot-com crash at the beginning of the millennium
led to a large decline in stock prices, but no domino effect beyond that.
Because most stock-holding is done with wealth people actually have, rather
than with borrowed money, people's portfolios went down in value, they took the
hit, and basically there the hit stayed. Leverage or no leverage made all the
difference. Stock market crashes don't crash the economy. Waves of bankruptcies
in the financial sector—or even fears of them—can. The lesson is: Don't
allow much leverage in the financial sector!
Financial leverage means
borrowing a lot. What does it mean to not allow much leverage? It means
requiring banks and other financial firms to raise a large share (say 30%) of
their funds either from their own earnings or from issuing common stock whose
price goes up and down every day with people's changing views of how profitable
the bank is. When people buy common stock, they know they are taking on risk.
By contrast, when banks borrow, whether in simple or fancy ways, those they
borrow from may well think they don't face much risk, and are liable to panic
if there comes a time when they are disabused of the notion that the don't face
much risk. Common stock gives truth in advertising about the risk those who
invest in banks face. One might question whether banks should be forced to
issue stock to immediately get up to 30% of their funding coming from stock,
but forcing banks to retain all of their earnings until and unless they reach
that 30% threshold of being financed by stock has no real downside.
If banks and other financial
firms are required to raise a large share of their funds from stock, the
emphasis on stock finance
- Provides a strong shock absorber that not only turns defangs the worst of a crisis, and also
- Makes each bank enough safer that after a period of market adjustment, investors will treat this low-leverage bank stock (not coupled with massive borrowing) as much less risky, so the shift from debt-finance to equity finance will be more costly to banks and other financial firms only because of fewer subsidies from the government: less of an implicit too-big-to-fail subsidy, less of an implicit too-many-to-fail subsidy, and less of the tax subsidy to borrowing.
My view on this owes a lot to
an important book by Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig: The Bankers' New
Clothes. This book has persuaded many economists.
Sometimes people point to
aggregate demand effects as a reason not to reduce leverage with
"capital" or "equity" requirements as described above. New tools in monetary policy should make this much less of an issue going forward. And in any case,
raising capital requirements during times of low unemployment such as now is
the right thing to do. Sometimes people think the economy as a whole will take
on too little risk if banks are required to have low leverage. My view is that
if the taxpayers are going to take on risk, they should do it explicitly
through a sovereign wealth fund, where they get the upside as well as the
downside. (See the links here.) The US government is one of the few entities financially strong enough
to be able to borrow trillions of dollars to invest in risky assets. However
controversial that is, providing an implicit guarantee to financial firms that
get the upside while the taxpayers foots the bill for the bailouts should be
more controversial. The way to avoid bailouts is to have very high capital
requirements, so bailouts aren't needed.
Miles Kimball is the Eugene D.
Eaton Jr. Professor of Economics at the University of Colorado and also a
columnist for Quartz.
A number of commentators have
been surprised by the length of the current bull-market. I myself have worried
on several occasions over the last few years.
Given that the main driver of
the stock market has been interest rates, one should anticipate a rise in rates
to drain the punch bowl. The recent weakness in emerging markets is a reaction
to the steady tightening of financial conditions resulting from higher US
rates.
The domestic US economy has
remained largely immune. Tariff barriers and tax cuts have more than offset the
monetary drain.
Historically the correlation
between the US stock market and other equity markets is high. Recent decoupling
is within the normal range.There are sound fundemental reasons for the
decoupling to continue, but it is unwise to predict that, 'this time it's
different.'
The danger signs are:
An upside breakout in the
USD index (U.S. officials are constantly talking the currency down).
A slowdown in U.S. growth
despite the prospect of further tax cuts.
At present the USD is not
excessively strong and economic growth remains robust.
The global economic recovery since
2008 has been exceptionally shallow. US fiscal policy has engineered a growth
spurt by pump-priming. When the downturn arrives it will be protracted, but it
may not be as catastrophic as it was in 2008. Lightening seldom strikes in the
same way twice. A 'melancholy long withdrawing breath,' might be a more likely
scenario. A decade of zombie companies propped up by another, much larger round
of QE.
When will it happen? Probably
not yet. The economic expansion (outside the tech and biotech sectors) has been
engineered by central banks and governments. Animal spirits are mired in debt;
this has muted the rate of economic growth for the past decade and will prolong
the downturn in the same manner as it has constrained the upturn.
Markets behave in a suboptimal
manner unless they are permitted to clear. The Austrian economist Joseph
Schumpeter described this phase as the period of 'creative destruction.' It can
clearly be postponed, but the cost is seen in the misallocation of resources
and a structural decline in the trend rate of growth.
I remain uncomfortably long of
US stocks. To misquote St Augustine, 'Grant me a hedge Lord, but not yet.'
Colin Lloyd is a veteran of
financial markets of more than 30 years.Visit his website In the Long Run.
Cyclically, the U.S. economy
(as well as that of the EU) is overdue a recession. Consensus amongst
macroeconomic analysts suggests the recession around late-2020. It is highly
likely that, given current forward guidance, the recession will arrive somewhat
earlier, some time around the end of 2019-start of 2020, triggering a large
downward correction in financial markets. Unless, of course, a different shock,
arising from the ongoing problems in the financial and real economies across
the emerging markets and China, leads us into a global downturn ahead of the
U.S. and European one. Timing is a precarious game of guesses and
ambiguity-rich analytical forecasts. That said, the fundamentals are now ripe
for a Global Financial Crisis 2.0. History tells us, it is likely to be more
painful than the previous one.
Get the rest of Constantin's
in-depth analysis on the matter in his piece: The conditions are ripe for a Global
Financial Crisis 2.0
Dr. Constantin Gurdgiev is
Professor of Finance at Middlebury Institute of International Studies at
Monterey and continues as adjunct assistant professor of finance at Trinity
College, Dublin.
There is no obvious frequency
for crisis (financial or not). It is true that in recent US cycles, recessions
have happened every 6 to 10 years. But in earlier decades (pre-1980) recessions
were more frequent. Some of these recessions have a banking or financial crisis
component, others do not. Although all of them tend to be associated with large
swings in stock market prices. If you go beyond the US then you see even more
diverse patterns. Some countries (e.g. Australia) have not seen a crisis in
more than 20 years.
Ignoring the actual frequency,
we typically look for signs of crisis by using leading indicators or signals of
imbalances. Unfortunately, some of these early indicators have limited
forecasting power. And imbalances or hidden risks are only discovered ex-post
when it is too late.
From the perspective of the US
economy, the US is approaching a record number of months in an expansion phase
but it is doing so without massive imbalances (at least that we can see). Yes,
the current account is in deficit, (some) debt levels are high, stock and
housing prices look expensive,... but many of these indicators are not too far
from historical averages either. For example, the stock market risk premium is
low but not far from an average of a normal year. In this search for risks that
are high enough to cause a crisis, it is hard to find a single one.
So everything is fine? I do
not think so. We have a combination of an economy that has reduced scope to
grow because of the low level of unemployment rate. Maybe it is not full
employment but we are close. A slowdown will come soon. And there is enough
signals of a mature expansion that it would not be a surprise if, for example,
we had a significant correction to asset prices. In addition we have a long
list of risks. Domestic ones: effect of trade war, US politics, the mid-term
elections,… And some global ones: China, Italy, Brexit, Middle East,… The
chances none of these risks delivers a negative outcome when the economy is
slowing down is really small.
So I think that a crisis in
the next 2 years is very likely through a combination of an expansion phase
that is reaching its end, a set of manageable but not small financial risks and
the likely possibility that some of the political or global risks will deliver
a large piece of bad news or, at a minimum, would raise uncertainty
substantially over the next months.
-
Antonio Fatas is a professor
at INSEAD Business School, a Senior Policy Scholar at the Center for Business
and Public Policy at the McDonough School of Business (Georgetown University,
USA) and a Research Fellow at the Center for Economic Policy Research (London,
UK).
In the US we have a flattening
of the Treasury yield curve. That is an accurate indicator we are nearing a
recession. This recession is expected to come in the form of a moderate slow
down over a handful of fiscal quarters. We are already seeing this in certain
segments and it’s nothing the US can’t overcome, but it does cause panic as to
how long it will last since uncertainties over long term growth are
strengthening. In Europe economies are still catching up from the last downturn
and political fears persist over a potential breakdown in Italy - or a full
blown trade war which would affect economies dependent on exports like Germany.
Away from that we are seeing a slowdown of unknown proportions in China and the
world hasn’t dealt with a major slowdown in China for a very long time. China
has a number of factors at play that could cause a recession in the US or a G20
economy and kick off a domino effect, stifling long term global growth.
Regardless, global political furor has everyone on edge and there are many
risks in flux.
Chad Hagan is a financier,
author and CEO and Chief Investment Officer of Hagan Capital Group.
As we reach the tenth
anniversary of the 2008-09 Financial Crisis and Great Recession a key question
is when will the next recession will begin? This is especially of interest
given that the current expansion is now rather long in the tooth. However, we
are already on the road towards the next downturn given that periods of
prolonged interest rate hikes are often precursors to downturns and the U.S.
Federal Reserve has now raised its benchmark rate eight times since 2015. It is
noteworthy that the three years prior to the 2008-09 financial crisis were also
marked by a period of rising rates. The triggers of the next major downturn are
underway and involve the interaction between public debt, rising interest rates
and a trade/tariff war induced economic slowdown. The recovery from the 2008-09
recession is incomplete given that fiscal stimulus and easy money have resulted
in a greater global debt pile. Along with traditional culprits such as Italy,
Japan and Greece which saw their general government gross debt to GDP ratios
grow between 2008 to 2018 (Italy-102% to 130%; Japan-183% to 234%; Greece-109%
to 191%) there are now growing US and Chinese debt piles. The US has seen its
gross government debt to GDP ratio rise from 74% to 108% while China’s has
grown from 27% to 48%. China’s number may well be an underestimate as some
analysts have suggested it is well over 60 percent as a result of local
government debts. Moreover, its infrastructure fueled economic growth rate is
slowing. Governments will go into the next recession with fewer economic tools
at their disposal as the already large public debt and deficit burden will
limit fiscal policy. Moreover, while interest rates are rising and slowing
growth they are not high enough to allow for substantial stimulatory
reductions. Creative monetary policy will be further limited given that central
bank balance sheets are already swollen from quantitative easing. Also, growing
international discord will also make it difficult to coordinate policy action
as the world economy slows in the wake of trade wars.
Livio Di Matteo is Professor
of Economics at Lakehead University in Canada. Livio contributes to the Worthwhile Canadian Initiative and
also manages his own blog, Nothern Economist 2.0.
We know another crisis is
coming, eventually--in the same way we know there will be another earthquake
around the world, eventually. If I knew when the next crisis was going to hit,
I would adjust my portfolio accordingly just as I would know where not to buy
real estate if I knew where and when the next earthquake was going to hit. But
I don't really think periodic crises matter that much over the very long run as
these convulsions tend to be followed by new highs in standards of living not
just in rich countries, but increasingly around the world. The most important
thing is to keep our ethical and our economic wits about us lest we panic and
make unwise, growth-reducing policies based on the idea that it has been
"the final crisis of capitalism" or something like that.
Art Carden is a Research Fellow
at the Independent Institute in Oakland,
California and an Associate Professor of Economics at Samford University’s
Brock School of Business. He is a contributor to the book Future: Economic Peril or Prosperity?
A study from the San Francisco Fed shows that the length of time an economy
has been expanding is not a good predictor of when the next crisis is coming.
So we can't say that a crisis is "due" just because it has been about
a decade since the last one. Like many economists who came of age in the
aftermath of the last crisis, I'm a little reluctant to make (public) forecasts
of when and why the next will occur. A big lesson from history is that unknown
unknowns will surprise us, and that should instill a sense of humility.
I have read compelling
arguments that the next financial crisis could be sparked by geopolitical
events, a crisis in China, a crisis in the leveraged loan market, or even
something like a cyber attack that disrupts payment systems. About as far as I
will go at this point is to speculate that the speed at which we go from
some triggering event to a full-blown crisis could be much faster than before,
for several reasons:
First, it is less clear that
massive international coordination and cooperation like we saw in the last
crisis would be feasible, though markets are as interconnected as ever. Second,
there is a lack of fiscal and monetary space to respond to a crisis. That
generally makes crises more severe, and could also destroy confidence. Third, technological and financial
innovations are all about complexity and speed-- that is both a benefit and a
risk.
Fourth, when the last crisis
was beginning, there was pretty widespread acceptance of the wisdom of strong
independence for central banks. The last crisis put a really bright spotlight
on central banks and to various extents among citizens and politicians eroded some support for this independence, or at least made it seem less sacred. So in
the next crisis, central banks could feel constrained by the very real
possibility that they will have their independence restricted.
Beliefs and expectations can
change in an instant, and we see this in crisis after crisis. In the next major
crisis, for all of the above reasons, beliefs about policy inefficacy will
likely be self-fulfilling.
Carola Binder, PhD, is an
Associate Professor of Economics at Haverford College.
Business expansions don’t die
of old age. Actuarial tables tell me that as I get older, the probability that
I will die tomorrow inexorably increases, but economic data do not have that
pattern. There is little if any evidence that the probability of a recession
starting in the next quarter increases as the length of an expansion grows
longer. Even so, it would not be exactly surprising if a recession came along
soon. Journalists often remind us that when June 2019 comes around, this
expansion will be the longest in business cycle history. For some reason, they
less often note that if we measure from peak to peak, the current cycle is
already the longest in U.S. history – 130 months and counting, as of October
2018, compared with the previous record of 128 months. The exact catalysts of
the next recession are anyone’s guess. A Chinese slowdown? Turkish debt?
Failure of a big financial corporation? An asteroid strike? It could be
anything. What know more about are the factors that will make it harder to cope
with a downturn when it does come. The biggest such factor, in my opinion, is
the huge imbalance between fiscal and monetary policy in the United States. It
is not normal for fiscal deficits to be approaching record highs, and still
growing, when the economy is at or close to full employment. When the crash
comes, it will be very hard to persuade Congress to embark on further fiscal
stimulus. If it does not, the Fed will have to bear the burden of expansionary
policy all by itself. Yet it has little room to maneuver. Interest rates are
just now approaching a neutral level. If a financial crisis were to hit,
interest rates would be back at zero bound in a blink. Then what?
Ed Dolan is an American
economist who holds a PhD in economics from Yale University. He is a Senior
Fellow at the Niskanen Center.
The next crisis has already
begun, but we do not yet see the signs. The most likely sources of stress are
opaque accounting and questionable governance at Chinese firms, Donald Trump's
fiscally irresponsible tax cuts for the rich and corporations, and the rise of
various other populist leaders (besides Trump) who prefer mercantilist trade
policies. Other factors of interest are over-compliant central banks that value
economic growth over economic stability and the rising costs of climate
disruption. In terms of a global recession, I think that corporate debt markets
might be the first to run into trouble either due to fraud or regulatory
interventions that reduce liquidity or the perceptions of risk. Although the
international trading system is fairly robust relative to the situation in the
1930s, I could see a Trumpian-style war of all-against-all as a likely first
casualty of any sizable macro disruption, in the same way that rising tariffs
in the US (Smoot-Hawley) and elsewhere were erected in the years after 1929's
Black Friday. Although companies with large domestic revenues might appear as
beneficiaries in an isolationist world, I think that their share prices will
fall after a brief increase as they experience disruptions and other collateral
damage from populist policies.
David Zetland, PhD, is an
Assistant Professor at Leiden University College The Hague, where he teaches
various classes on economics.
In a nutshell, I see crises as
caused by a collapse in credit from a high level of private debt. Since the US
& UK had that experience in 2008 and are still carrying high levels of
private debt, their credit levels are low compared to past years, and a serious
decline in credit-based demand as happened in 2007/9 (from +15% to -6% of GDP
in the US's case) is unlikely. However I think they'll continue slipping from
positive to negative credit over time, as Japan has done since its crisis in
1990. Many countries that avoided a crisis in 2007/8 did so by continuing to
expand private debt: China, Canada, Korea, Australia and France are prominent
there. I think they will have localised crises in the next 1-3 years.
Steve Keen is an Australian
economist and a professor of economics at the University of Kingston in London.
The next crisis will not be as
severe as the last crisis, because the banks are in good shape. As such, think
of the crises that happened in 1987 or 2000-2, which were not systemic. Also,
look at places where floating rate liabilities and other short liabilities are
used to support long-term assets. All crises occur from short-term liabilities
financing overvalued assets. As such, look at real estate in hot coastal
markets (where ARM financing is high), corporate floating rate debt, and
private student loans. Something will be triggered as a result of the Fed
tightening rates. We already have the first taste of that with weak countries
like Argentina, Turkey, South Africa, etc. The initial effects of monetary
tightening have knocked down those countries because they relied on increasing
liquidity. The next phase will come when decreasing liquidity makes something
crack where a set of oversupplied assets can no longer service its debts.
Again, this isn’t a repeat of 2008-9 (though we still haven’t fixed repo
financing). This will be something where demand fails because stimulus cannot
continually increase, and we are oversupplied in a number of areas – autos,
homebuilders, etc. That what recessions are for – eliminating bad debts, and
recycling the assets into better-financed holders at lower prices.
· https://www.focus-economics.com/blog/the-next-financial-crisis-how-when-it-will-happen-according-to-26-experts
La próxima crisis financiera (cómo y cuándo ocurrirá según 26 expertos) . https://lnkd.in/ggWPiE7 Via @FocusEconomics
La próxima crisis financiera (cómo y cuándo ocurrirá según 26 expertos) . https://lnkd.in/ggWPiE7 Via @FocusEconomics
2.1 The Next Financial Crisis
We have been reading numerous comments recently about a forthcoming
recession and the next crisis, particularly on the tenth anniversary of the
collapse of Lehman Brothers. The question is not whether
there will be a crisis, but when. In the past fifty years, we have seen
more than eight global crises and many more local ones, so the likelihood of
another one is quite high. Not just because of the years passed since the 2007
crisis, but because the factors that drive a global crisis are all lining up.
-
What drives a financial crisis? Three factors.
- Demand-side policies that lead investors and citizens to believe that there is no risk.
- Excessive risk-taking in assets that are perceived as risk-free or bullet-proof.
- The realization that this time is not different. Bubbles do not burst because of one catalyst, as we are told to believe. The 2007-2008 did not start because of Lehman, it was just a symptom of a much wider problem that had started to burst in small doses months before. Excess leverage to a growth cycle that fails to materialize as the consensus expected.
What are the main factors that
could trigger the next financial crisis?
- Sovereign Debt.
- Incorrect perception of liquidity and VaR (Value at Risk).
The fallacy of synchronized growth triggered the beginning of what could
lead to the next recession. A generalized belief that monetary policy
had been very effective, growth was robust and generalized, and debt increases
where just a collateral damage but not a global concern. And with the
fallacy of synchronised growth came the excess complacency and the acceleration
of imbalances. The 2007 crisis erupted because in 2005 and 2006 even the most
prudent investors gave up and surrendered to the rising-market beta chase. In
2017 it was accelerated by the incorrect belief that emerging markets were fine
because their stocks and bonds were soaring despite the Federal reserve
normalization.
-
What will the next crisis look like?
Nothing like the last one, in my opinion. Contagion is much more difficult
because there have been some lessons learnt from the Lehman crisis. There are
stronger mechanisms to avoid a widespread domino effect in the banking system.
When the biggest bubble is sovereign debt the crisis we face is not one of
the massive financial market losses and real economy contagion, but a slow fall
in asset prices, as we are seeing, and global stagnation.
-
The next crisis is not likely to be another Lehman, but another Japan, a widespread zombification of global economies to avoid the pain of a
large re-pricing of sovereign bonds, that leads to massive tax hikes to pay the
rising interests, economic recession and unemployment.
The risks are obviously difficult to analyse because the world entered into
the biggest monetary experiment in history with no understanding of the side
effects and real risks attached. Governments and central banks saw rising
markets above fundamental levels and record levels of debt as collateral
damages, small but acceptable problems in the quest for a synchronised growth
that was never going to happen.
-
The next crisis, like the 2007-08 one, will be blamed on a symptom (Lehman
in that case), not the real cause (aggressive monetary
policy incentivising risk-taking and penalising prudence). The next crisis,
however, will find central banks with almost no real tools to disguise
structural problems with liquidity, and no fiscal space in a world where most
economies are running fiscal deficits for the tenth consecutive year and global
debt is at all-time highs.
-
When will it happen? We do not know, but if the warning signs of 2018 are
not taken seriously, it will likely occur earlier than expected. But the governments and central banks will not blame themselves, they
will present themselves -again- as the solution.
-
-
A version of this article first appeared here.
- https://www.dlacalle.com/en/the-next-financial-crisis/
3.Escenario coyote
2020
-
Roubini, y Bernake nos indican un posible Escenario Coyote 2020, otros
economistas como Geither,Paulson
analizan los riesgos, Creo que a dia de hoy pronosticar este escenario
entre un 20-30 % de posibilidades, es ser cauteloso, veremos si las empresas
hacen sus planes de viabilidad y sus planes de contención asumiendo este
escenario.
El año pasado, Bernake y Brunello Rosa identificaron diez factores de riesgo capaces de provocar una recesión en Estados Unidos y todo el mundo en 2020. Muchos tienen que ver con Estados Unidos. Las guerras comerciales con China y otros países, sumadas a restricciones a la inmigración, a la inversión extranjera directa y a la transferencia tecnológica, pueden tener profundas repercusiones sobre las cadenas globales de suministro, con amenaza de estanflación (desaceleración del crecimiento a la par de un aumento de la inflación). Y el riesgo de un menor crecimiento en Estados Unidos se ha vuelto mayor, ahora que el estímulo de la rebaja impositiva de 2017 ya se agotó.En tanto, después de la publicación de aquel artículo, los mercados de acciones estadounidenses se han mantenido en un estado de efervescencia. A esto se suman riesgos relacionados con la aparición de nuevas formas de deuda (lo que incluye a muchos mercados emergentes, que tienen buena parte de sus deudas en moneda extranjera). Como la capacidad de los bancos para actuar como prestamistas de ultima instancia,esta cada vez mas limitada, la iliqueidez de los mercados financieros los hace mas vulnerables a derrumbes repentinos.
El calculo de la liqiuidez real es un factor clave
El año pasado, Bernake y Brunello Rosa identificaron diez factores de riesgo capaces de provocar una recesión en Estados Unidos y todo el mundo en 2020. Muchos tienen que ver con Estados Unidos. Las guerras comerciales con China y otros países, sumadas a restricciones a la inmigración, a la inversión extranjera directa y a la transferencia tecnológica, pueden tener profundas repercusiones sobre las cadenas globales de suministro, con amenaza de estanflación (desaceleración del crecimiento a la par de un aumento de la inflación). Y el riesgo de un menor crecimiento en Estados Unidos se ha vuelto mayor, ahora que el estímulo de la rebaja impositiva de 2017 ya se agotó.En tanto, después de la publicación de aquel artículo, los mercados de acciones estadounidenses se han mantenido en un estado de efervescencia. A esto se suman riesgos relacionados con la aparición de nuevas formas de deuda (lo que incluye a muchos mercados emergentes, que tienen buena parte de sus deudas en moneda extranjera). Como la capacidad de los bancos para actuar como prestamistas de ultima instancia,esta cada vez mas limitada, la iliqueidez de los mercados financieros los hace mas vulnerables a derrumbes repentinos.
El calculo de la liqiuidez real es un factor clave
Bernanke alerta de que la economía de
EEUU se acerca al 'Momento Coyote'
- El crecimiento basado en el endeudamiento termina siendo insostenible
- El 'Momento Coyote' llegará en 2020 tras años de crecimiento
8/06/2018 -
17:51
Ben
Bernanke, ex presidente de la Reserva Federal de EEUU, ha criticado con
severidad las políticas fiscales de Donald Trump, que llegan en una parte del
ciclo en la que pueden hacer más daño que beneficio. La economía y los mercados
financieros van mantener el impulso gracias a un mayor endeudamiento fruto de
los estímulos, pero llegará un momento en el que los agentes mirarán hacia
abajo y verán que no hay nada más que deuda que refinanciar a unos tipos superiores,
se asustarán y llegará el Momento Coyote.
Los
estímulos "van a influir en la economía a lo grande este año y el próximo,
y después en 2020 el Coyote se va a caer por el precipicio", haciendo
referencia al desventurado personaje de los dibujos animados de la Warner
Brothers.
Bernanke
cree que el recorte del Impuesto de Sociedades hasta el 21% (desde el 35%) y la
reducción del IRPF diseñados por el equipo de Donald Trump "hacen el
trabajo de la Reserva Federal más difícil".
"Lo que
estamos obteniendo es un estímulo en un momento que no es nada adecuado... la
economía se encuentra ahora mismo en situación de pleno empleo", asegura
Bernanke.
La tasa de
desempleo en Estados Unidos cayó en mayo hasta el 3,8% (6,1 millones de
parados), una cifra que no se alcanzaba desde mayo del año 2000, después de
bajar al 3,9% en abril tras seis meses estancada. La economía ya está
funcionando a toda máquina y no necesita más gasolina, para Bernanke esos
estímulos fiscales deben guardarse como munición para contrarrestar próximas
recesiones.
-
-
¿Qué es el Momento Coyote?
-
-
El
economista jefe de
ING para Bélgica hizo referencia esta situación hace aproximadamente un año
al llamar 'Momento Coyote' a lo que tradicionalmente se ha conocido como
'Momento Minsky', por su parecido con la escena más famosa del cómico personaje
de los Looney Tunes, que cuando mira bajo sus pies observa que no hay nada que
los sostenga y es entonces cuando da comienzo su caída en picado. Los largos
periodos de estabilidad fomentan el endeudamiento de empresas y hogares, lo que
a la postre hace más vulnerable el sistema, explicaba Vanden.
En este
contexto, el banco central puede terminar subiendo tipos (como está ahora
haciendo la Fed), poniendo en problemas a las partes más endeudadas de la
economía, y finalmente llevando a los mercados financieros a corregir... uno
podría comparar esto con el Coyote en su afán por atrapar al Correcaminos,
cuando el primero corre sobre un acantilado y sólo se cae cuando mira hacia
abajo y ve que sólo hay vacío.
Por su
parte, el
Momento Minsky es el suceso bautizado con el nombre del prestigioso
economista Hyman Minsky, que se produce cuando los mercados colapsan tras un
periodo de excesivo optimismo. Este 'momento' llega cuando los inversores
sobreendeudados se ven obligados a vender incluso sus inversiones más sólidas
para poder pagar sus préstamos, lo que provoca grandes pérdidas en todos los
mercados y una ingente demanda de liquidez que obliga a los bancos centrales a
prestar dinero a manos llenas.
Hace dos años que avisan de una posible crisis en 2020, pero aun no esta
claro si será una recesión de 2-4 años o una crisis económico financiera de mas
larga duración, al depender de otros factores además de los financieros
(aranceles, guerra comercial, acciones de geoeconomica y geopolítica)
-
La gestación de una recesión y crisis
financiera en 2020
Sep 13, 2018
Nouriel
Roubini , Brunello Rosa
NUEVA YORK – A diez años del colapso
de Lehman Brothers, todavía se debaten las causas y consecuencias de la crisis
financiera, y si se aprendieron las enseñanzas necesarias para prepararnos para
la próxima. Pero la pregunta más pertinente a futuro es qué activará la próxima
recesión y crisis global, y cuándo.
·
Acciones para
evitar escenario CoyoteOtros enlaces
- https://forosenar.blogspot.com/2018/11/economists-predict-another-us-recession.html
- https://forosenar.blogspot.com/2018/11/la-actual-desaceleracion.html
- https://www.eleconomista.es/economia/noticias/9523546/11/18/Draghi-advierte-del-aumento-de-la-incertidumbre-para-la-inflacion-y-la-perdida-de-impulso-economico.html
- https://www.eleconomista.es/banca-finanzas/noticias/9524379/11/18/El-BCE-mantendra-la-respiracion-asistida-a-los-bancos-europeos-con-una-nueva-ronda-de-financiacion-millonaria.html
- https://www.eleconomista.es/mercados-cotizaciones/noticias/9521586/11/18/Todas-las-grandes-economias-estan-al-borde-de-caer-en-un-pozo-profundo.html
- https://elpais.com/economia/2018/11/14/actualidad/1542191565_830241.html?id_externo_rsoc=FB_CC&fbclid=IwAR2VUBVGKd-TF4JQotLZsr6xu-kSKvlhNyccKj2eMERijK_dRanq2Kpy_ps
